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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is made up of stand-alone essays on the determinants of the investment climate in 
emerging market economies. Chapter One presents the purpose of this study, the significance of the 
research to policy makers, researchers and investors and the limitations of the research. Chapter Two 
investigates empirically whether business regulations, as measured by the „Doing Business‟ indicators, 
have an impact on investment in 29 emerging market economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
emerging Europe. The results show that secure property rights and the level of business entry 
regulation influence the investment climate in these economies. In addition, efficiency of the judicial 
system, investor protection and the flexibility of employment regulation were found to be insignificant 
determinants of  investment.  
 
Chapter Three explores the effect of business regulation on stock market liquidity, using data from a 
selection of 15 stock markets in Africa. The results from the panel data analysis show that the degree of 
business regulation does not influence stock liquidity. However, the results confirm that greater 
protection of minority share-holders' rights, as well as lender and better collateral and bankruptcy laws 
enhance stock market liquidity. There was anecdotal evidence to suggest that improved judicial 
efficiency enhances stock market liquidity. The legal origin was found to be significant in explaining the 
differences in the legal systems of these countries. Countries that have adopted French legal traditions 
were found to have less active stock markets and less investor and property rights protection compared 
to countries that have adopted English legal traditions.  
 
Chapter Four investigates the effect of the level of business regulation, infrastructure and political 
environment on investment in 29 African countries. The results provide evidence to show that lower 
levels of business regulation, less corruption and a stable political environment are important in 
enhancing investment.  
 
The final essay examines the effect of business regulation and geography on investment in a sample of 
37 countries in Africa. The results show that more secure property rights and fewer import and export 
regulations have a significantly positive effect on private investment. In addition, being landlocked and 
distant from the sea has a negative effect on investment. Furthermore, the findings revealed that 
property rights protection in landlocked economies is not significantly different from that in coastal 
economies.  
 
 iv 
In all the studies, the legal origin was found to be significant in explaining cross-country differences in 
the legal systems of the selected countries. These findings have important implications for policy 
makers, multi-lateral organisations and investors. 
 v 
OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie proefskrif bestaan uit alleenstaande studies oor die beslissende faktore van die 
beleggingsklimaat in opkomende markekonomieë. In hoofstuk een word die doel van die studie; die 
belang van die navorsing vir beleidmakers, navorsers en beleggers; en die beperkings van die navorsing 
aangebied. Hoofstuk twee bevat ‟n empiriese ondersoek om te bepaal of sakeregulasies, soos deur die 
“Doing Business”-aanwysers gemeet, ‟n uitwerking op belegging in 29 ontluikende markekonomieë in 
Afrika, Asië, Latyns-Amerika en ontluikende Europa het. Die resultate toon dat veilige eiendomsregte 
en die vlak van regulasie vir toetrede tot besigheid die beleggingsklimaat in hierdie ekonomieë 
beïnvloed. Hierbenewens is die doeltreffendheid van die regstelsel, die beskerming van beleggers en die 
buigsaamheid van indiensnemingsregulasies gevind onbelangrike beslissende faktore vir belegging te 
wees. 
 
In hoofstuk drie word verslag gelewer oor die uitwerking van sakeregulasies op die likiditeit van 
effektemarkte op grond van data van ‟n keur van 15 effektemarkte in Afrika. Die resultate van die 
paneeldata-analise toon dat die graad van sakeregulasie nie die likiditeit van effekte beïnvloed nie. Die 
resultate het egter bevestig dat meer beskerming van die regte van minderheidsaandeelhouers asook 
verbeterde wetgewing ten opsigte van kredietverskaffing, aanvullende sekuriteit en insolvensie die 
likiditeit van effektemarkte verhoog. Anekdotiese bewyse is gevind wat aan die hand doen dat 
verbeterde regsdoeltreffendheid ook die likiditeit van effektemarkte verhoog. Die regsoorsprong is as 
beduidend gevind ter verklaring van die verskille in die regstelsels van hierdie lande. Lande wat Franse 
regstradisies aanvaar het, is gevind minder aktiewe effektemarkte en minder beskerming van beleggers 
en eiendomsregte te hê, vergeleke met lande wat Engelse regstradisies aanvaar het. 
 
In hoofstuk vier word die uitwerking van die vlak van sakeregulasie, infrastruktuur en die politieke 
omgewing op belegging in 29 Afrika-lande bespreek. Die resultate toon bewyse dat laer vlakke van 
sakeregulasie, minder korrupsie en ‟n stabiele politieke omgewing belangrike faktore is om belegging te 
bevorder. 
 
Die laaste studie ondersoek die uitwerking van sakeregulasies en geografie op belegging in ‟n monster 
van 37 Afrika-lande. Die resultate toon dat veiliger eiendomsregte en minder invoer- en 
uitvoerregulasies ‟n beduidende positiewe uitwerking op privaat belegging het. Hierbenewens is daar ‟n 
negatiewe uitwerking op belegging in lande wat deur land omring is en ver van die see af is. Die 
bevindings het ook aan die lig gebring dat die beskerming van eiendomsregte in ekonomieë wat deur 
land omring is, nie aanmerklik verskil van dié in kusekonomieë nie. 
 
 vi 
In al die studies is regsoorsprong as beduidend gevind in die verklaring van verskille in die regstelsels 
van die gekose lande. Hierdie bevindings het belangrike implikasies vir beleidmakers, multilaterale 
organisasies en beleggers. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background and statement of the problem 
It is suggested that a country must have a favourable investment climate, in order to enhance private 
sector led growth. Indeed, one of the World Bank‟s overall development strategies is improving the 
investment climate of countries. It is argued that improving the investment climate for the private 
sector is basic to the development of enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises, and the 
growth of employment opportunities, which is crucial for sustained economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The investment climate is also referred to as the business environment in which firms 
operate. There are number of definitions of the investment climate in the literature. The investment 
climate is defined as „the set of location specific factors that shape the opportunities and incentives for 
firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand‟ (World Development Report, 2004:19). According 
to Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu, (2006), a productive investment climate is considered to be 
an environment where governance and institutions support entrepreneurship and well-functioning 
markets in order to help generate growth and development. Stern (2002) defines the investment climate 
as the policy, institutional and behavioural environment, both present and expected, that influences the 
returns and risks associated with investment. According to Dollar,Hallward-Driemeir and Mengistae,  
(2005:1), a favourable investment climate is „the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in 
which firms operate – factors that influence the link from sowing to reaping. Underlying all these 
definitions is a broad consensus that the investment climate encompasses the macroeconomic aspects 
of an economy and financial, political and institutional factors as well as the physical infrastructure and 
human capital necessary for productive investment. Therefore, a good investment climate should offer 
all types of firms an investment environment that reduces the costs, risks and barriers to competition, 
thereby enhancing their profitability and growth. It is this understanding of the investment climate that 
forms the basis of this research study. 
  
The argument for advocating improvements in the investment climate is that firms are the primary 
source of wealth creation. Firms offer employment opportunities, supply most goods and services and 
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provide the bulk of the tax base needed to fund public services. A favourable business environment 
must therefore respond to firms‟ needs by directly reducing unjustified costs and risks arising from 
unfavourable government policies and burdensome regulations by, for instance, restraining rent seeking 
which increases the cost of doing business.  
 
Another vital aspect of a good investment climate is the establishment of credibility and certainty about 
the rules of social and economic interaction. This entails among other factors better protection of 
property and investors‟ rights, efficient contract enforcement and flexible employment regulations. 
There are numerous empirical studies that provide evidence of the role these factors have on 
investment and growth of economies. For instance, according to Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
(2001), reduced security of property rights is correlated with less aggregate investment and economic 
growth. Furthermore, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) show that greater 
protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by the controlling shareholders is associated 
with larger stock markets. In addition, Limão & Venables (2001) show that poor infrastructure 
accounts for 40 per cent of predicted trade costs for coastal economies and up to 60 per cent for 
landlocked economies. 
 
 However, if it is well established and conceptually understood, why are there significant differences in 
the investment climate within and across countries? Measuring the performance of institutions has 
historically been a challenge due to their nature and complexity. The studies by, for instance Knack & 
Keefer (1995), Rodrik (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) contributed significantly to 
understanding institutions and their effect on economic performance. Their research also underscored 
the importance of secure property rights, good governance and simple rules and regulations on the 
investment decisions of different types of firms. However, these and other studies used proxies for 
institutional measures that did not offer policy makers much guidance on what interventions to pursue. 
More recently, data has become available on measurable aspects of institutional performance like 
business regulation.  
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However, there are a limited number of studies that have investigated investment climate, especially in 
the context in which it is defined above. The few studies available have focused on Asia, Latin America 
and Europe. For instance, Hallward- Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006) and Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier and Mengistae (2005) investigate the effect of the investment climate on firm performance 
using a selection of Asian economies. Other studies have focused on the investment climate and its 
influence on foreign direct investment (FDI) for instance in Asia (Shoko, 2007; Khalid and 
Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007), Europe (Witkowska, 2007; Hajkova, Nicoletti, Vartia and Yoo, 2006) 
and Latin America (Quazi, 2007). More recently, Loayza and Servén (2010) investigate the effect of 
business regulation on economic performance using microeconomic and macroeconomic data. There 
are no empirical studies that have focused mainly on African economies. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The broad empirical objective was to investigate the effect of investment climate determinants on 
investment by focusing on a selection of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. The 
specific objectives were to: 
 
a) Investigate empirically the effect of the business regulatory environment on investment using a 
selection of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe; 
 
b) Examine the effect of business regulation on the liquidity of stock markets in Africa; 
 
c) Ascertain the relative importance of business regulation, the political environment and 
infrastructure on investment in African countries; and 
 
d) Establish the effect of business regulation and geography on investment in a selection of 
African countries. 
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1.3 Approach 
This dissertation presents a number of analytical perspectives on the effect of investment climate 
determinants on investment using data on a selection of emerging market and African economies. The 
analysis is disaggregated into four stand-alone essays each investing the effect of business regulation 
and a number of macroeconomic variables on investment from different but complementary 
perspectives. This approach was used because of the following reasons: 
a) Firstly, the dataset used in this research was only available for five years. Data on business 
regulations from the “Doing Business database‟ which was the main source of business 
regulation data for this study is only available from 2003. Therefore, for the analysis, data on all 
macroeconomic variables and business regulations were from 2003 to 2007. Secondly, 
macroeconomic indicators on African economies are characterised by missing data points. To 
overcome this challenge, only those variables and economies with the relevant data points were 
selected.  
 
b) Because of the two limitations mentioned in (a) above, in order to generate robust and reliable 
estimates, disaggregating the data into smaller clusters -four empirical studies- for analysis was 
the most appropriate way to mitigate this challenge. Panel data analysis techniques provide 
reliable estimates with small but complete or „strongly balanced‟ datasets.  
 
Each study investigated the effect of business regulations and a selection of macroeconomic variables 
on investment. Business regulations are included in each analysis to capture the institutional aspect of 
investment climate in the study. Few studies have  included business regulation variables in their 
empirical estimations because this data was not readily available.   
 
Furthermore, the variables investigated in each chapter were selected because they impose numerous 
direct and indirect costs on businesses in developing economies especially Africa. These costs arise 
either through the production process or in getting what is produced to the required markets. Some 
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direct costs include labor and capital, while indirect costs are transport, telecommunication and the 
regulatory environment. 
 
Considering this point of view, the research explores the effect of the business regulatory environment 
on the ability of firms to raise capital through the stock market. Furthermore, the research examines the 
effect of the political environment, infrastructure and business regulation on investment. These three 
factors are all in the external environment and together can impose significantly high costs on firms 
thereby influence long-run investment. Lastly, the research investigates how business regulations and 
the spatial location of a country influences investment. In this case the research aims to understand 
how the location of country can impose indirect costs on firms and as a result influence investment at a 
macroeconomic level.  
 
Unlike economic growth that can be measured by changes in the gross domestic product or gross 
national income of a country, there is no universal measure of the investment climate. In this research 
study we identify some of its determinants and in the various combinations mentioned above are 
considered reliable proxy indicators of the investment climate.  
 
All data for the studies were from secondary sources. Data on business regulations were obtained from 
the „Doing Business‟ database. All macroeconomic variables were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators. The political risk variables were obtained from the Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive. 
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
This dissertation makes significant contributions theoretically and empirically. Empirically, the research 
uses a new dataset of business regulatory variables on Africa and a selection of emerging economies. In 
addition, it tests the significance of business regulations and other investment climate determinants on 
investment using panel data techniques and models. 
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Theoretically, it contributes to the scanty body of knowledge on investment climate determinants and 
their effect on investment in Africa. It also provides knowledge to guide policy design and reforms 
intended to reduce the cost of doing business on the African continent. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
The main limitation of this study was data availability of data. The data consists of a relatively short 
longitudinal dimension, 2003 to 2007. However, in spite of the limitations, the issues examined in the 
various chapters are relevant in understanding and addressing the challenges to the investment climate 
of countries, most especially in Africa.  
 
There are also a number of assumptions taken in this study that are dependent on the data. It is 
assumed that the investment climate is the same throughout a country, although this is seldom the case. 
For instance there are differences in the investment climate of urban and rural areas or the capital cities 
and other towns or even provinces or regions in a country. This study could have been enriched further 
if this data was readily available.  
 
In addition when measuring the business regulation variables, data was obtained from businesses in the 
country‟s most populous city and it was assumed that: 
1. Each business employs between 50 to 200 people; 
2. Each business is 100 per cent domestically owned; 
3. The business is a limited liability or  public company; 
4. Each business had full information on what was required to accomplish the various business 
activities (like register a business or enforce a contract).  
Therefore, it is implicitly implied that the factors that affect these firms will affect all types of 
businesses – micro, small, large, agricultural, sole proprietors, partnerships, rural or urban. 
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1.6 Organisation of the study 
This dissertation is made up of a collection of four stand-alone essays and is organised into six 
chapters: 
 
Chapter One includes the introduction and statement of the problem, the objectives, significance and 
limitations of the research. 
 
Chapter Two reviews the effect of business regulation on investment in a selection of 29 emerging 
economies in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. 
 
Chapter Three examines the effect of business regulation on stock market liquidity in a selection of 15 
stock markets in Africa. 
 
Chapter Four examines the effect of the level of business regulation, the political environment and 
infrastructure on investment in 29 countries in Africa. 
 
Chapter Five investigates the effect of business regulation and geography on investment in 37 
economies in Africa. 
 
Chapter Six summarises the important research findings obtained in this research study and offers 
some recommendations and areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: EFFECT OF BUSINESS REGULATION ON INVESTMENT 
IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The World Development Report 2005 asserts that a good investment climate, that is the local 
institutional, regulatory and policy environment in which firms operate stimulates economic growth by 
providing firms with the incentive to invest and improve productivity. Although economic theory 
suggests that there are numerous factors that foster long term economic growth, more recent studies 
affirm that encouraging private sector led growth has much broader ramifications on the economy as a 
whole. In particular, encouraging entrepreneurship and the development of all types of firms is vital in 
addressing poverty and underdevelopment in developing economies.  
 
The concept of a good investment climate is closely associated with the seminal work by Hernando de 
Soto (1990, 2000) on property rights and ownership. He argues that the economic success of a country 
like Japan can be attributed to a large extent to a clear system of property rights that was created after 
the Second World War. He provides evidence to suggest that people in developing countries lack an 
integrated formal property system, which results in informal ownership of land and goods. As a result 
the poor, in today‟s developing economies, find it difficult to leverage their current informal 
ownerships into capital as collateral for credit – a vital aspect of free enterprise. This argument is 
supported by others like Knack & Keefer (1995) and Rodrik (2000), who affirm that institutions and 
property rights not only influence the magnitude of investment, but also the efficiency with which 
inputs are allocated. 
 
The World Bank has carried out numerous studies over the past decades to develop better indicators 
for measuring institutional quality or performance and its effect on economic outcomes. More recently, 
the „Doing Business‟ project was established after numerous studies were undertaken (Enterprise 
Surveys) to monitor and benchmark the business regulatory environment of countries around the 
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world. This project is a time-in-motion study that collects data on regulations that enhance and 
constrain business activity. A number of multilateral organisations now use these performance 
indicators as targets that developing countries must aspire to achieve in order to obtain donor aid and 
grants. However, there has been criticism about the validity of these indicators. There are those who 
contend that these indicators distort the role of the institutional environment by creating simplistic 
quantitative measures of regulations that are complex, integrated systems (Berg & Cazes, 2007; Davis & 
Kruse, 2007). Furthermore, there are those who assert that the methodology used in obtaining these 
indicators prejudices essential tradeoffs in institutional design. For instance the exclusive focus on the 
private costs paid by entrepreneurs obscures the cost to the state of providing better business or 
property registration services; yet developing economies require functional registries with reliable 
information that can be used in litigation (Arrunada, 2008). 
 
The purpose of this cross-sectional study is to investigate empirically whether business regulation, a 
determinant of the investment climate influences investment. Data from 2003 to 2007 on a selection of 
29 emerging market economies from Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe obtained from the „Doing 
Business‟ database were used. These economies have been selected because emerging market 
economies are considered to be economies in transition that face similar constraints in encouraging 
domestic investment and attracting foreign capital flows. It is anticipated that the empirical analysis 
from this study will contribute to deeper understanding of the business regulatory factors that influence 
investment in these economies. Furthermore, this study will contribute to the ongoing debate on 
regulation and its influence on economic performance outcomes. 
 
 The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a review of the literature on 
investment, institutions and regulation. Section 2.3 contains a discussion on the theoretical aspects of 
the institutional factors identified as explanatory variables in this study. Section 2.4 describes the 
empirical strategy for the analysis of this study while Section 2.5 provides a description of the data. 
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Section 2.6 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 2.7 summarises the 
findings of the research and draws conclusions. 
 
2.2. Literature review  
Institutions have been referred to in the literature as the „rules of the game‟ in relation to economic 
performance. It is suggested that without them economies would not exist in the functional state in 
which we know them today. Institutions according to North (1991) are “humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)”.  
 
Their role in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) 
structure to human interaction. According to North (1991), institutions affect the performance of the 
economy by their effect on the cost of exchange and production. Together with the technology 
employed, they determine the transactions and transformation (production) costs that make up total 
costs. Therefore, they determine the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. It is 
important to emphasise that institutions would not exist if human interaction consisted of only 
harmonious relations. 
 
Even though institutions play a significant role in social interaction, understanding their effect on 
economic outcomes has evolved slowly over the past century. According to economic history, the 
initial neoclassical view assumed that exchange in the market arose spontaneously from the close 
interaction of self-seeking individuals. The goods that were traded in every market were assumed to be 
homogenous so that prices provided the only information needed to make decisions on production and 
purchasing (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Therefore, no individual had sufficient power to influence 
the market price since exchange was driven simply by utility considerations. In other words, they 
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argued that competition arising out of the pricing system coordinated the transactions of the market 
and there were no cost implications.  
 
It was Ronald Coase (1937) who questioned the notion of costless transactions. He argued that there 
were costs that arose out of negotiations during business transactions such as drawing up contracts and 
carrying out inspections. It was these costs that determined whether a transaction would take place or 
not. As he succinctly said, „Business men in deciding on their ways of doing business and on what to 
produce take into account transaction costs. If the costs of making an exchange are greater than the 
gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not take place and the greater production 
that would flow from specialization would not be realized‟ (Coase, 1992:716). Furthermore, Coase 
(1960) argued that what were traded in the market were not, physical entities, but the rights to perform 
certain actions, and the rights which individuals possessed were established by the legal system. In 
essence if property rights and, contract enforcement –that are all influenced by the legal system – are 
vital aspects of the economic system of a society, then it makes little sense for economists to discuss 
the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place 
since this influences the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting. Numerous contributions to 
the literature on the role of institutions and transaction costs and their effect on investment and 
economic growth (like North 1981, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik 2000) have been made since 1960. They all to a large extent 
suggest that institutions contribute to understanding cross-country differences in economic 
performance. However, the channel through which they influence economic performance is still largely 
disputed.  
 
Excessive regulation is considered to be an outcome of inefficient institutions. More recent studies 
have focused on different aspects of regulation in product markets and their effect on investment and 
long-term economic growth. In an empirical study to investigate the effect of regulatory reform on 
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investment in several sectors of 21 OECD1 countries, Alesina, Ardagna, Nicholetti and Schiantarelli 
(2005) show that regulation is a significant determinant of investment. They provide sufficient evidence 
to show that product market regulation can influence the costs that existing firms face when expanding 
their productive capacity. Their overall assessment shows that regulatory reforms that substantially 
lower entry barriers encourage investment. Dawson (2006), using data on regulation from the 
Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW)2, was able to highlight significant findings that suggest 
that countries with less overall regulation have higher rates of private investment. By looking at 
different types of regulation (credit market, labour market and business), the study found that the index 
of business regulation3 was statistically significant and positively related to growth. This suggests that 
countries with less business regulation tend to experience higher long-term growth rates as a result of 
higher factor productivity.  
 
2.3.  Theoretical considerations 
Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson and the other Coasean proponents assert that the 
formal institutional environment – the laws, government and judiciary – affect economic performance 
by determining (together with the technology employed) transaction and production costs. Therefore, 
given that the main objective of firms is to maximise profits, it is implicitly implied that a favourable 
institutional environment ensures investors in the market are awarded returns on their investments in 
the form of income or dividends. Furthermore, they argue that the enforcement of property rights and 
contract law is an important feature of an efficient and effective institutional framework. This section 
discusses the theoretical considerations relating to the effect of the regulatory variables used in this 
study.  
 
                                                 
1
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2 Economic Freedom of the World Index includes regulation as one of its five major areas. Others areas are: (1) legal 
structure and security of property rights, (2) freedom to trade internationally, (3) access to sound money, and (4) size of 
government expenditures, taxes and enterprises (Fraser Institute‟s Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report). 
3 Business Regulation in EFW Index consists of: price controls, administrative conditions and new businesses, time with 
government bureaucracy, starting a business and irregular payments. 
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There are a number of theoretical arguments on regulation and its effect on economic outcomes. These 
are firstly, Pigou‟s public interest theory of regulation. Pigou (1938) assumes that unhindered markets 
often fail because of problems of monopolies or externalities. Furthermore Pigou assumes that 
governments are benevolent and capable of correcting these failures through regulation. In other 
words, regulation seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large. Secondly, the public choice 
theory, in general, views government as less benevolent and regulation as socially inefficient. According 
to Stigler‟s (1971:3) theory of regulatory capture, „regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed 
and operated primarily for its benefit.‟ In other words, governments‟ regulatory agencies created to act 
in the public interest instead protect the commercial or special interests of those they are charged with 
regulating. The theory of regulatory capture is a core aspect of the public choice premise.  
 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2002), in a study to investigate the regulation of entry 
of start-up firms in 85 countries found little evidence to show that stricter regulation of entry provides 
better social outcomes, like higher quality products or improved competitiveness. On the other hand, 
they found that stricter regulation of entry is associated with significantly higher levels of corruption 
and a larger unofficial economy. Their findings support the public choice theory that emphasises rent 
extraction by government bureaucrats. 
 
The research on the regulation of labour markets has been studied extensively. So, why do 
governments regulate their labour markets? The fundamental argument for most interventions is that 
free labour markets are imperfect and as a result there are rents in the employment relationship. 
Employers exploit workers to extract these rents leading to both unfairness and inefficiency.  As a 
result governments use different forms of labour regulations to protect workers from employers.  
According to Botero, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, (2004), these include – in addition to 
basic civil rights protections4 – employment law5, collective relations law6 and social security law7. Their 
                                                 
4
 Basic rights include, maternity leave or minimum wage 
5 Employment laws govern the individual employment contract, for instance restricting the range of feasible contracts, 
raising laying off costs or increasing working hours. 
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study investigates the regulation of labour markets through employment, collective relations and social 
security laws in 85 countries. Botero et al., (2004) found that heavier regulation of labour has adverse 
consequences for labour-force participation and employment prospects especially for the young. There 
is also evidence to show that flexible labour markets are of great importance in reducing unemployment 
and improving the competitiveness of the economy. According to Di Tella & MacCulloch (2005), in 
their study of 21 OECD countries for the period 1984-1990, increasing the flexibility of the labour 
market increases both the employment rate and the labour force participation rate. Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005), in a study to investigate the effect of labour market regulation on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) across 19 western and eastern European countries, found that greater flexibility in 
the host country‟s labour market is associated with a higher probability and volume of investment. On 
the other hand, there are those who argue that flexible labour markets increase income inequalities and 
widen the skills gap, which negatively influences long-run investment and economic growth (Pissarides, 
2001). The channel through which employment regulation affects investment is ambiguous. 
 
It is well established that better investor protection encourages the development of financial markets 
and it is through this channel that it influences the real economy. It is argued that greater protection of 
shareholders and creditors fosters better functioning stock and debt markets and facilitates the flow of 
capital to firms. Furthermore according to La Portia et al., (1997), there is evidence to show that when 
investor rights, such as the voting rights of shareholders and the reorganisation and liquidation rights of 
creditors, are extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to provide 
finance. There is also evidence to show that the financial system is a vital channel through which 
investment capital and savings are transformed into real investment thereby enhancing capital 
accumulation (Beck and Levine, 2003; Ndikumana, 2000).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 Collective or industrial relation laws regulate the bargaining, adoption and enforcement of collective agreements, the 
organisation of trade unions and industrial action by workers and employers. 
7 Social security laws govern the social response to needs and conditions that have a significant impact on the quality of life, 
such as old age, disability, death, sickness and employment. 
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Weak property rights8 are considered a deterrent to investment since the perceived risk of losing 
ownership rights or returns on investment is increased. Evidence from the empirical literature in cross-
country studies shows that less secure property rights are correlated with less aggregate investment and 
slower economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). The argument put 
forward is that secure property rights are essential in order to induce investment by entrepreneurs. 
According to Pattillo (2001), in an analysis of the investment behaviour of Ghanaian firms, weak 
property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in some types of firms and those firms with the least 
secure property rights invest nearly 40 per cent less than those with more secure property rights. This 
evidence is corroborated in a study on property rights and investment in five post-communist 
countries. The results show that those entrepreneurs who perceive their property rights to be the least 
secure reinvest 32 per cent of their profits, while those who perceive their property rights to be secure 
reinvest 56 per cent (Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). Given that there is ample evidence to 
show that secure property rights are important for investment, it is usually assumed that these rights 
will be enforced. However, according to North (1991) this assumption is flawed for a couple of 
reasons. The first is that there are problems that arise from information asymmetries such as moral 
hazard or adverse selection and the second is that enforcement relies on agents whose own utility 
functions influence outcomes. Therefore, in order to provide the incentive to transact, regulators and 
courts that ensure that agents abide by the laws are essential. In addition, according to Botero et al., 
(2003) on judicial reforms across countries around the world, simplifying judicial procedures and 
increasing the flexibility of courts can enhance judicial efficiency. 
                                                 
8
 It is the right conferred on the owner (individual or firm) of a property to consume, sell, rent, mortgage, transfer and 
exchange the property. 
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2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Empirical strategy 
The discussion above illustrates how both regulatory and macro economic factors may influence 
aggregate investment in the selected emerging market economies. Ignoring nonlinearities, the economic 
relationship being identified is: 
  
                                                                                                 ...(2.1) 
 
where  is the gross capital stock of country i in year t, measured as gross capital stock as a 
percentage of gross domestic product(GDP).   consists of a selection of business regulation 
variables,    is a selection of control variables and    is the composite error term. The coefficients 
of interest are and .  
 
The primary challenge of this study is the data. The history of the data is limited to five years and there 
are missing data points. In order to estimate the effect of business regulation on investment, a panel-
data framework approach is used. According to Baltagi (2005), this approach has a number of 
advantages and these include: panel data analysis combines both time-series and cross-sectional data to 
increase the number of observations; and the modelling options and appropriate tests enable one to 
examine the relevance of fixed, random and systematic time and country effects. The basic framework 
for the analysis is in the form of the following regression equation: 
 
                                                                                                        ...(2.2) 
 
Where (i = 1, . . ., N) is the number of countries and (t = 1, . . ., T) is the number of time periods.  
consists of K regressors but excludes a constant term. According to Greene (2003), the individual 
effect is  where  contains a constant term and a set of individual or group-specific variables that 
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may be observed or unobserved and that are taken to be constant over time, t. If  is observed for all 
individuals and contains only a constant term, the entire model can be treated as an ordinary linear 
model and fit by least squares.  
 
However, if   is unobserved but correlated with , the least-squares estimator of  is biased and 
inconsistent due to an omitted variable.  The model is then referred to as a fixed effects model and is 
specified as follows; 
 
                                                                                                                ...(2.3) 
 
Where   and embodies all the observable effects. The fixed effects approach takes  to be 
a group-specific constant term in the regression model that does not vary over time. On the other hand 
if   is unobserved but uncorrelated with the regressors, then the model is referred to as a random 
effects model and is formulated as follow; 
 
                                                                          ...(2.4) 
 
                                                                                                             ...(2.5) 
 
in which  is the random heterogeneity specific to the ith observation and is constant through time.  
In order to determine whether the individual effects are correlated with the regressors, the Hausman 
(1978) specification test may be used. It is used to test for orthogonality of the random effects and the 
regressors. Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality (no correlation between the individual effects 
and explanatory variables), both random and fixed effects estimators are consistent but the random 
effect estimator is efficient while the fixed effects estimator is not. Under the alternative hypothesis that 
the individual effects are correlated with the regressors, the random effects estimator is inconsistent 
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while the fixed effects estimator is consistent and efficient. The difference between the two estimators 
is the Hausman test statistic defined simply as 
 
,                                                        ...(2.6) 
 
The Hausman test statistic will be distributed asymptotically as χ 2 with k degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis that the random estimator is correct. 
 
2.4.2. Data and variable definition 
This section describes the data used in the study. The analysis covers a selection of 299 emerging 
market economies over a five-year sample period, 2003 to 2007. Emerging market economies were 
selected because firstly, according to the World Bank Global Economic Prospects (World Bank, 2007) 
over the past five years, these economies have accounted for between one-quarter and one-half of 
global growth and this has been attributed to, among other factors, a better investment environment in 
these countries. Secondly, these countries had data on all the explanatory variables.  
 
The „Doing Business‟ project collects data on regulations that enhance and those that constrain 
business activity. Data on business regulations is obtained in 10 areas of business activity across 181 
economies. These are starting a business, dealing with licences, employing workers, registering 
property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts 
and closing a business. The data are collected in a standardised way using a simple business case to 
ensure comparability across countries and over time with assumptions about the legal form of the 
business, its size, location, and nature of its operations. The data are obtained from local experts, 
government officials and other professionals who routinely administer or provide advice on legal and 
regulatory requirements. The fundamental premise of the „Doing Business‟ project is that economic 
                                                 
9 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and South Korea. 
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activity requires good rules. Therefore, if these rules are to benefit all types of firms then they must be 
designed to be efficient, accessible to all who need to use them and simple in their implementation. All 
the business regulation variables are obtained from the „Doing Business‟ online database (World Bank, 
2007a). 
 
Investment: In order to measure investment, gross capital stock measured as a percentage of GDP is 
used. One would expect that a favourable regulatory environment would result in an increase in 
investment that would be reflected as an accumulation of capital stock. Gross capital stock is used 
instead of private investment because of data availability on the selected countries.  
 
Business entry regulation: The direct effect of business formalisation on investment is captured by one 
variable in this study – the number of procedures to start a business. This variable measures the pre- 
and post-incorporation procedures that are officially required by an entrepreneur to formally operate a 
business and it is measured in absolute values. The more procedures there are to start a business the 
more difficult it is to operate in the formal economy. Previous studies show that the number of 
procedures is highly correlated with time and cost, which implies that it costs entrepreneurs more in 
terms of fees and delays to start a formal business where there are lengthy procedures (Djankov et al., 
2002). The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negatively associated with investment growth.  
 
Employment regulation: In the „Doing Business‟ project, the flexibility of employment regulation is 
measured by the rigidity of the employment index. It is the simple average of three sub-indices – a 
difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of working hours index and difficulty of firing index.  All sub-
indicators take on values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation.  
 
The expected effect of property rights on investment is captured by three variables in this study – 
property registration, contract enforcement and licensing regulation. Property registration is measured in 
terms of the number of procedures required to register a property (land or a building).  The number of 
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procedures is recorded in absolute figures and records all procedures that are legally or in practice 
required to transfer property title from a seller to a buyer. The coefficient of this variable is expected to 
be negatively associated with investment since more procedures imply that securing property rights is 
cumbersome. Contract enforcement, which is an indicator of the efficiency of the judicial system in a 
country, is measured in terms of the number of procedures required to enforce a commercial dispute. 
In this study, the number of procedures is considered to be a sufficient indicator therefore, the cost and 
time to execute these procedures is excluded. In addition, there is evidence to show that higher 
procedural formalism is a strong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution, lower enforceability 
of contracts, higher corruption, as well as reduced honesty, consistency and fairness of the system 
(Djankov et al., 2003). The number of procedures is recorded in absolute values and includes the steps 
required to file the case until judgment is enforced. Fewer procedures to enforce a contract imply that 
the courts are efficient and therefore it is simple to enforce a contract while more procedures would 
imply the contrary. Licensing regulation: The ease or difficulty of securing all the required building licences 
by a contractor is an indicator of the burden of securing property rights. There is also theoretical 
evidence to suggest that licensing regulations, among other factors, have negatively influenced private 
investment in the electricity sector of Tanzania (Marandu, 2004). Licensing registration measures the 
number of procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a standardised 
warehouse. The procedures are measured in absolute values and more procedures imply that licensing 
regulation is rigid and cumbersome. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negatively 
associated with investment. 
 
The effect of investor protection on investment is captured by two variables in this study – protection 
of minority shareholders‟ rights and lender and borrowers‟ rights. In this study, shareholders’ rights are 
measured by the investor protection index. This index measures the strength of minority shareholder 
rights against directors‟ misuse of corporate assets. According to the „Doing Business‟ project, three 
aspects of investor protection are measured: transparency of transactions, liability for self dealing and 
shareholders‟ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. The investor protection index value is 
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the simple average of these three sub-components and its values range from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating better investor protection. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positively 
associated with investment. Borrowers’ and lenders’ rights are considered to be important in facilitating 
access to credit for investment from financial institutions. The borrowers and lenders measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. The index 
values range from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws provide 
better protection of the rights of borrowers and lenders. The coefficient of this variable is expected to 
be positively associated with investment. 
 
A set of control variables that is considered to be a significant determinant of investment is also included 
in the analysis. These variables include total labour force participation rate (a proxy of human capital 
development), income measured as the log of GDP (a measure of the size of the economy), inflation 
measured by changes in the consumer price index (a measure of macro-economic stability) and savings 
that are measured as gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. Data on these variables are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2007). A number of dummy variables are 
included in order to capture the unobservable factors such as cultural and historical differences that 
may influence investment. These include the Latin America dummy, Africa dummy, Asia dummy and 
emerging Europe dummy.  
 
It is argued that institutions are endogenous and therefore reflect various historical and cultural 
influences (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2000). In addition, it has been affirmed that countries with rising or 
high incomes are more likely to have better regulatory environments. Therefore, in order to estimate 
the effect of institutions on economic outcomes, a source of exogenous variation is required. In the 
literature, instrumental variables have been used as a source of exogenous variation in institutions. As 
an instrument variable for institutional quality, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) used mortality 
rates of colonial settlers in colonised areas while Hall and Jones (1999) used the fraction of the 
population that spoke English and western European languages. The legal origin has been used by La 
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Porta et al., (1997) as an instrument for regulation. According to Botero et al., (2004), a country‟s 
approach to regulation is shaped by its legal tradition. La Porta et al., (1997) provides evidence to show 
that the laws of the different colonisers and occupiers significantly influenced the legal systems of the 
conquered countries. They found that common and civil law traditions utilise different strategies for 
dealing with market failure. The common law traditions that emerged from England rely on contract 
and private litigation. Whereas civil law traditions that evolved from Roman law and were incorporated 
into civil codes in France and Germany rely on direct supervision of markets by the governments. 
Socialist law traditions that were adopted in countries that came under the influence of the former 
Soviet Union also rely on government regulation and state ownership. 
 
 In this study the legal origin is used as the instrumental variable. English legal origin dummy: English legal 
origin equals 1 if the country has English common law traditions and 0 if the country has French civil 
law or socialist law traditions as defined by the origin of each country‟s commercial/company law (La 
Porta et al.1999). French legal origin dummy: French legal origin equals 1 if the country has a French civil 
law tradition and 0 if the country has English common law or socialist law traditions.  There is evidence 
to show that countries with French and socialist legal origins tend to have lower levels of property 
rights protection than countries with English legal origins (Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002). 
Therefore, it would be expected that countries with English legal origins attract more investment than 
those with French or socialist legal origins. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
and Tables A.1.and A.2 (in the Appendix) show the summary statistics for Latin America and Africa, 
emerging Europe and Asia respectively. 
 
2.5.  Empirical results 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics  
The average number of procedures required to formalise a business for the full sample of countries is 
10 (see Table 2.1) while the emerging European countries (Table A.2 Appendix A) have the lowest 
number of procedures. Therefore, in this sample it is easiest to start a business in the emerging 
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European countries (eight procedures) and it takes longest (12 procedures) in the Latin American 
countries (see Table A.1 Appendix A). It is most difficult to secure a building licence in emerging 
European economies (30 procedures), while it is easiest in Latin America. There is no significant 
variation in investor protection among the four regions. However, it is important to note that Morocco 
and Tunisia perform the worst in this index; while Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa offer investors 
the highest protection. Lender and borrower rights are best protected in emerging European 
economies and are least protected in Latin American economies. The largest variation among the 
regulatory variables is in employment regulation with a minimum of seven and a maximum of 66 for 
the full sample. The emerging European economies in this sample have the most flexible employment 
regulations while Asian economies have the least flexible employment regulations. It takes an average 
of 37 procedures to enforce a contract in the full sample of countries with no significant difference in 
the various regions. Botswana has the least number of procedures required to enforce a contract with 
an average number of 29 while Algeria has the most (47) number of procedures. Property registration 
takes longest in Africa, with Nigeria recording the maximum value of 19 procedures (maximum in the 
full sample), whilst it is easiest in Asia, with Thailand recording two procedures (minimum in the full 
sample). 
 
 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics - full sample 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Business entry regulation 10.40 2.91 5 19 
Licensing regulation 21.56 8.67 10 56 
Employment regulation 34.41 13.68 7 66 
Property registration 6.94 3.15 2 19 
Lender and borrower rights 5.23 2.34 3 10 
Investor protection  5.55 1.22 3 8.7 
Contract enforcement 37.84 4.49 29 47 
Income  249.87 388.52 5 2364.44 
Savings 24.88 11.69 3 54 
Inflation 7.70 5.33 0 29 
Labour force participation rate 65.93 8.24 49 84 
Gross capital formation 24.41 6.56 14 46 
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2.5.2. Discussion of regression results 
The empirical results presented in Table 2.2 show the effect of a selection of business regulation 
variables on investment for an unbalanced panel of 29 countries over the period 2003 to 2007. Random 
effects regression estimates are generated for all the specifications of the model specified in equation 
(2.1).  Column (1) regression estimates show the effect of the selected explanatory variables on 
investment measured as gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. In Column (2), three regional 
dummies are included to establish whether there are significant variations in the four regions selected. 
Lastly, column (3) shows results in which the instrumental variable – legal origin – is included. Column 
(1) results show that the number of procedures to start a business has a negative and significant effect 
on investment. This result implies that excessive business entry regulation is a significant barrier to 
investment in a country. This result is consistent with findings by Djankov et al., (2002), which show 
that more barriers, in the form of administrative hurdles to registering a business, hampers the number 
of firms that can operate in the formal economy.  
 
Employment regulation was found to have an insignificant effect on investment in this sample of 
countries. Although this result contradicts a priori expectations, it is consistent with the suggestion of 
Bertola and Rogerson (1997) that the effect of flexible labour regulation may only be felt when other 
labour market institutions that seek to create an equilibrium in the labour market, like those that affect 
employment (severance pay, advance notice laws) and wages (minimum wages), are well established and 
enforced. They argue that if these regulations do not exist or are not harmonised then flexible labour 
regulation may have an adverse or no effect on employment levels in the economy. Furthermore, the 
result obtained may arise from selection bias. The assumptions made in measuring the employment 
regulation variable are not representative of the working population, especially in developing or 
emerging economies. 
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Table 2.2: Regression Results (Random Effects GLS Regression)  
 
 Dependent variable 
Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Business entry regulation -0.05624** 
(-2.06) 
-0.02745 
(-1.01) 
-0.03860** 
(-1.48) 
Employment regulation                    -0.00327 
(-0.54) 
-0.00459 
(-0.73) 
-0.00619 
(-1.01) 
Property Rights    
Licensing regulation                        -0.02078** 
(-2.21) 
-0.03744** 
(-3.26) 
-0.03272*** 
(-3.28) 
Property registration                      -0.04437* 
(-1.83) 
-0.04692* 
(-2.01) 
-0.05710** 
(-2.50) 
Contract enforcement                      0.02505 
(1.21) 
0.01782 
(0.92) 
0.01637 
(0.87) 
Investor Protection    
    Borrower and lenders‟ rights          0.02211 
(0.66) 
-0.03452 
(-0.92) 
-0.02767 
(-0.79) 
Minority shareholders‟ rights          -0.09493 
(-1.53) 
-0.06075 
(-1.02) 
-0.10561 
(-1.83) 
Income     0.00587** 
(2.56) 
0.00684*** 
(3.06) 
0.00506** 
(2.48) 
Savings    0.00296*** 
(4.55) 
0.00314*** 
(4.84) 
0.00258*** 
(4.33) 
Inflation 0.00017 
(0.17) 
0.00038 
(0.41) 
0.00052 
(0.54) 
Labor force participation rate           0.00073 
(0.71) 
0.00128 
(1.32) 
0.00085 
(0.09) 
Latin America (dummy)                                                                                 -0.09716** 
(-2.94) 
 
Africa (dummy)                                                                                 -0.02583 
(-0.98) 
 
Asia (dummy)                                                                                  -0.04478 
(-1.37) 
 
French legal origin   -0.03912** 
(-2.01) 
Socialist legal origin   0.03407 
(1.35) 
Constant                                        0.19580* 0.24333** 
(2.18) 
0.35102*** 
(3.05) 
R-Squared   0.4601 0.5715 0.6085 
Wald chi2                                          (11)42.68 
[0.0000] 
(14)48.99 
[0.0000] 
(13)39.37 
[0.0001] 
Observations 87 87 87 
Hausman Test Wald Chi2(11)=6.55 
[0.8342] 
Wald Chi2(14)=5.79 
[0.9714] 
Wald Chi2(13)=8.64 
[0.7998] 
Notes: t-statistic are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. *** indicates significance at 1%,  
** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
 
According to the „Doing Business‟ project, it is assumed that the worker (unit of measurement of this 
variable) is a nonexecutive, full-time employee who has worked in the same company for 20 years. 
However, there is evidence to show that, for instance, in the European Union in 2005 only 17 per cent 
of the working population had job tenure of 20 or more years. The average tenure was 10.6 years. In 
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central and eastern Europe, the average tenure was 9 years and Poland had the longest average tenure 
of 11.7 years in 2003. In Latin America average tenure was approximately 6.2 years (Berg and Cazes, 
2007). Lastly, high costs associated with labour regulations increase the cost of production and have 
been blamed for the growth of the informal sector in many economies. In addition, it is well 
established that a significant proportion of the population in most developing economies is 
unemployed or is employed in the informal economy. Employment in the informal economy does not 
adhere to formal employment contracts and labour regulations although, arguably, there may be 
informal rules that govern employment relationships.  Therefore, it is plausible that the effect of rigid 
or flexible labour regulations as measured by this variable will not have an effect on investment in these 
economies. 
 
Two of the property rights variables were found to have a significant effect on investment: in 
particular, more rigid licensing regulation has a significant and negative effect on investment. This 
result implies that the longer it takes to secure the required licences and permits, the longer it takes to 
obtain full ownership and control of the property. Therefore it will also take longer to use the property 
as collateral or to transfer ownership.  This result is consistent with the literature that shows that easy 
and simple licensing procedures that enhance efficiency and transparency also enhance private 
investment (Marandu, 2004). Furthermore, the results also show that a one standard deviation 
reduction in the number of procedures required for registering a property, increases investment by 
approximately 1.4 per cent. This result confirms that formal ownership of property is less cumbersome 
when there are few administrative procedures required to register property. This result is consistent 
with a priori expectation and with evidence that shows that land reforms in Thailand that encouraged 
property titling increased access to credit for people with formal titles and increased land values and 
investment (Burns, 2005). The estimated coefficient for contract enforcement is insignificant. 
Intuitively, it would be expected that an efficient judicial system to resolve commercial disputes and 
enforce contracts would reduce the cost of doing business (for instance reduce litigation costs) and 
therefore enhance investment. However, according to Botero et al. (2003), the result obtained is 
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plausible, especially in developing economies where the judiciary is underfunded and therefore lacks the 
administrative capacity and personnel such as judges to operate efficiently. As a result, the judicial 
process is slow and is riddled with corrupt officials. They provide evidence to show that firms use 
alternative channels to resolve disputes like arbitration and informal or native courts (in Latin America 
they are known as mediation centres; and as; Lok adalats in India). These alternative channels are more 
efficient and officials are less able to extract bribes from litigants. 
 
Neither investor protection variable has a significant effect on aggregate investment. It is surprising that 
shareholder rights are not significant determinants of investment. This is inconsistent with the literature 
given that there is ample evidence to suggest that greater protection of shareholders‟ rights, by means 
of laws that regulate self-dealing, encourages investment in financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997). 
However, this result possibly arises for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were a number of 
assumptions taken into consideration when measuring this variable. It was assumed that the company 
was a food manufacturer that was domestically owned and listed on the country‟s most important stock 
exchange. Given that in most emerging economies the percentage of domestically owned companies 
that are listed on the stock exchange, in comparison to all formally owned domestic companies, is 
small, this result may be a reasonable representation. Secondly, the dependent variable measures total 
investment. Possibly investigating the effect of this variable on private investment may yield different 
results. The coefficients for income and domestic savings are significant and with the predicted signs. 
This result is consistent with the theory that high-income countries and high domestic savings are 
significant determinants of investment.  
 
Three regional dummies are included in column (2) of Table 2.2. These dummies are included because 
firstly, there are a number of unobserved factors not captured in this study like cultural or historical 
factors that may influence regulation differently in each of these regions. Secondly, it is asserted in 
numerous studies that Africa behaves differently from the other regions because of its unique 
demographic and socio-political environment. Only the Latin America dummy is significant at the 
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conventional levels, showing that this region has significantly less investment than emerging Europe. 
This result possibly arises from other factors not captured in this study like the political environment, 
crime and corruption that are synonymous with this region. Asia and Africa are both insignificant 
implying that they are not significantly different from emerging Europe. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients of both property rights variables remain considerable when the regional dummies are 
included. However, the magnitude for the coefficient of business entry regulation reduces considerably 
and is insignificant.    
 
The results obtained in column (3) of Table 2.2 after controlling for endogeneity confirm the results 
obtained in columns (1) and (2). Business entry regulation is a significant determinant of investment. 
Licensing regulation and property registration are both significant at the conventional levels and with 
the predicted signs. A one-standard deviation reduction in licensing procedures will increase investment 
by 2.8 per cent. In addition a one standard deviation reduction in property registration procedures will 
increase investment by 1.8 per cent. In this sample of countries, licensing regulation imposes the most 
administrative barriers on investment. Income and domestic savings are significant and with the 
predicted signs. The estimated coefficient for the legal origin was found to be negative and significant 
at a 5 per cent level implying that countries with French civil law traditions have almost up to 4 per 
cent lower investment than those with English common law traditions. These results are consistent 
with findings from previous studies (Beck et al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2002). Countries that have 
adopted English common law traditions have been found to have higher investment, since property 
rights are better protected than in countries that adopted French civil law traditions. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The pervasiveness of government regulation in business activity has raised many questions over the 
past decades. Does burdensome regulation create barriers for the people it is meant to protect? The 
purpose of this study was to investigate empirically whether business regulations as measured by the 
„Doing Business‟ indicators have an impact on investment. Using seven selected indicators from the 
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„Doing Business‟ database, a panel data analysis was performed on data for 29 emerging economies in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and emerging Europe for the period 2003 to 2007. The results suggest that 
investment in these emerging economies is influenced by security of property rights and the degree of 
business entry regulation. In particular, the results show that where there are fewer administrative 
procedures required to formalise a business, there is a positive and significant effect on investment in 
that economy. In addition, fewer procedures to register property or to secure business licences have a 
positive and significant effect on investment. Furthermore, the estimates generated show that flexibility 
of employment regulation is not a significant determinant of investment. This result confirms previous 
studies that show that the effect of flexible labour regulations on economic performance may only be 
felt when other labour market institutions are well established and enforced. In addition, the two 
indicators of investor protection - minority shareholders‟ rights, and lender and borrower rights- were 
found to be insignificant determinants of investment. The results obtained suggest that further analysis 
of the effect of the selected business regulatory indicators, using private and public investment as proxy 
variables for the investment climate, may provide more conclusive results about the validity of these 
indicators. It is also important to note that this study is limited in scope since it did not assess the effect 
that other factors considered to be important, such as the macroeconomic environment, infrastructure 
and the political environment, have on the investment in these countries. 
.
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CHAPTER 3: BUSINESS REGULATION AND STOCK MARKET  
LIQUIDITY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Stock markets are among the most important sources of long-term loanable funds that are used by 
investors mainly for fixed investment. They provide investors with efficient mechanisms to liquidate 
their investments in financial securities. Therefore, they are a major incentive to investment since they 
provide avenues for firm financing by offering a guarantee of mobility of capital in addition to 
encouraging saving among individuals. The establishment of an efficient stock market is, therefore, vital 
for any economy that is ardent on using scarce resources to achieve economic growth. Over the past 
three decades, the world‟s stock markets have experienced phenomenal growth due to financial 
liberalisation and the advent of globalisation. In Africa, the number of established markets has 
increased significantly from four, prior to 1990, to 22 in 2008 – although growth in the majority of 
these markets has not been considerable10. Indicators of stock market development show that African 
markets are small with few listed companies and low liquidity and market capitalisation (Yartey and 
Adjasi, 2007).  
 
Why have the majority of African stock markets remained small and highly illiquid, thereby rendering 
their economic benefits redundant?  There are those who argue that financial sector reform driven by 
donor agencies and multilateral organisations, as a prerequisite for aid, is the reason the majority were 
established. Therefore, they were set up as government initiatives and not driven by domestic market 
demand for new financial products (Moss, 2003). On the other hand, numerous studies on these 
markets suggest that stock market development in Africa has been hampered by macroeconomic 
                                                 
10 Before 1990 these were The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange, Casablanca Stock 
Exchange, Bourse de Tunis, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Nigerian Stock Exchange and Nairobi Stock Exchange. By 2008, 
the Stock Exchanges included Ghana Stock Exchange, Botswana Stock Exchange, Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, Lusaka 
Stock Exchange, Uganda Securities Exchange, Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange, Swaziland Stock Exchange, Rwanda over the 
Counter Exchange, Namibian Stock Exchange, Libyan Stock Exchange, Casablanca Stock Exchange, Bourse des Valeurs 
Mobilieres d‟Alger, Maputo Stock Exchange, Malawi Stock Exchange, Douala Stock Exchange and the west African 
regional exchange known as Bourse Régional des Valeurs Mobiliéres (BRVM) that serves Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea 
Bissau, Côte d‟Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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instability, underdeveloped financial intermediaries, weak or non-existent regulatory frameworks, weak 
institutions and poor investor protection (some studies include Tessema, 2003; Guide & Pattillo, 2006; 
Yartey, 2007). Even though these factors may largely explain the differences in performance, there are 
other underlying factors highlighted in the recent theory and empirical literature as additional plausible 
determinants. According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), the differences in the 
nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the world can be attributed to the degree to which 
investors‟ rights are protected from expropriation by insiders, arising from the nature of the legal rules 
and the quality of law enforcement of a country. They found that countries with poor investor 
protection, in particular those that adopted French civil law traditions, had smaller and narrower capital 
markets compared to countries that adopted English common law traditions.  
 
The purpose of this study is specifically to investigate the effect of business regulation on the liquidity 
of African stock markets. It is argued that liquid market enables firms acquire capital quickly thereby 
facilitating capital allocation, investment and growth. Furthermore, the ease with which equities are 
traded helps reduce investment risk (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). The reason why stock market liquidity is 
considered is because it has been found to be a robust predictor of capital accumulation and 
productivity growth in an economy (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Data on a selection of business 
regulation variables from the „Doing Business‟ database for 15 stock markets in Africa, over the period 
2003 to 2007, are used. It is anticipated that this study will contribute to a greater understanding of the 
factors that facilitate an enabling regulatory environment, which is essential for the sustained growth of 
the private sector in these economies. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides a brief literature review of 
institutional and regulatory factors that influence stock market activity and size in Africa. Section 3.3 
presents the variables, analytical framework and model specification used in the study. Section 3.4 
presents a discussion on the empirical results. Lastly, section 3.5 offers some conclusions and policy 
recommendations.  
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3.2.  Literature review 
There is a substantial amount of literature that explores the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. These studies largely confirm that both stock market and banking sector 
development have a strong positive effect on investment and growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Beck, 
Levine & Loayza, 2000; Bekaert, Harvey & Lundblad, 2001). There are a number of channels through 
which the stock market influences economic performance. According to Levine (1991), stock markets 
make financial assets traded in less risky since savers can buy and sell quickly when they wish to alter 
their portfolios. In addition, stock markets create more information about investment projects and can 
therefore guide investors‟ funds to better use (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Therefore, having less 
risky assets and easy access to capital markets improves the allocation of capital and enhances 
economic growth. The explanation postulated for this relationship is that stock prices reflect the 
marginal product of capital and are, therefore, reliable predictors of investment. This is based on the 
theory that efficient, secondary-market prices help investors distinguish good investments from bad 
ones through a mechanism like Tobin's Q (Tobin, 1969 and Von Furstenberg, 1977). Tobin asserts that 
if the market value of a company‟s stock is greater than its equity book value, then firms should 
undertake capital expenditure.  The profits generated will be higher than the cost of using the assets of 
the firm. Although Blanchard et al., (1993), in their study, found a limited role of market valuation on 
investment decisions, their findings suggest that stock prices partly influence investment choices of 
firms.  
 
It has also been suggested that institutions are the foundation for stock market growth. According to 
North (1991), capital markets will not grow unless the government has established a credible system 
that secures and monitors property rights and effectively enforces contracts. The series of papers on 
the law and finance by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny  (1997, 1998, 2000) – [henceforth 
LLSV] and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (2003) highlight the importance of the legal framework for 
financial development. According to Beck et al., (2003), there are two aspects to the law and finance 
“theory‟. The first is that financial development is higher in countries where legal systems enforce 
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private contracts and where property and creditor rights are protected. There is evidence to show that 
greater protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by the controlling shareholders is 
associated with a higher number of listed firms and higher valuation of stock markets (LLSV, 1997). 
They argue that when minority shareholders rights are protected by the law, they are more willing to 
pay for financial assets such as equity and debt. They do so because the perceived risk of expropriation 
is reduced. Hence there is increased certainty of a return in form of interest or dividends on their 
investments. Therefore, by limiting expropriation, the law raises the value that securities fetch in the 
market, which enables firms to finance their investments, which subsequently leads to expansion of the 
financial markets. There is also evidence to show that greater protection of minority shareholders‟ 
rights is associated with a lower concentration of ownership and control (Claessens et al., 2000). In 
addition, greater protection of property rights may increase not only the availability of external finance 
but also the efficiency of its allocation. It is argued that since securing returns from tangible and liquid 
assets is relatively easy, firms operating in a market with poorly defined or poorly enforced property 
rights may choose to invest more in fixed assets relative to intangible assets and may hold more cash 
and liquid assets relative to fixed assets (Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson, 
2003).  
 
It is also well established that not only is regulation important, but its enforcement by regulators and 
courts also is an essential element of financial development (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer, 2003). According to LLSV (1997,1998), when investors‟ rights, such as voting rights of the 
shareholders and the rights of creditors, are protected and well enforced by regulators or courts, 
investors are willing to finance firms. In contrast, when the legal system does not protect outside 
investors, access to external finance is constrained. They argue that financial contracts may become 
unfeasible because of problems arising from information asymmetries such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection or time inconsistency. Furthermore, according to Djankov et al., (2003), the role of the 
judiciary cannot be taken for granted since in many developing countries courts often lack the 
necessary resources and are slow or subject to political pressure. They show that as a result of such 
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inefficiencies, enforcement of private contracts through the court system is costly and is not sufficient 
to enhance investment. However, LLSV (2000), provide evidence to show that even among countries 
with well functioning judiciaries, those with laws and regulations more protective of investors have 
better developed capital markets.  
 
As noted earlier, there is ample evidence to support the view that the regulations protecting investors 
and the quality of their enforcement are positively associated with the depth and quality of financial 
markets. However, the question still unanswered is why some countries have more effective laws than 
others? According to the second view of the law and finance „theory‟, the differences among countries 
in the structure of laws and enforcement arises from the historical origin of their laws. The foundation 
of this argument is that the laws of different countries were, largely, transplanted by European 
colonialists. According to LLSV (1998), whether a country‟s commercial or company law is based on 
English, French, German or Scandinavian legal origins is important not only in explaining the country‟s 
laws on creditor rights, shareholders‟ rights and private property, but also when considering a country‟s 
financial development. Beck et al., (2003) and LLSV (1998) assert that French civil law was developed 
to unify the legal system, prevent jurisprudence and solidify state control of the courts. In contrast, 
English common law evolved to protect property owners from state control. This is referred to as the 
„political channel‟.  In addition civil law relies heavily on legal scholars to formulate its rules, statutes 
and comprehensive codes while common law is formed by judges who resolve specific disputes based 
on practice or precedent rather than on contributions by scholars (LLSV, 1998). This is referred to as 
the „adaptability channel‟.  It is therefore argued that English common law gives higher priority to 
private property vis-á vis the state and is more adaptable to changing conditions than French civil law. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, (2003) investigate the channels through which legal origins influence 
financial development. Their results show that the adaptability channel influences financial 
development more than the political channel. In other words, legal traditions that adapt efficiently to 
minimise the gap between the controlling needs of the state and the legal system‟s capabilities will 
foster financial development more. They also found that English common law countries have 
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significantly better developed financial intermediaries and markets as well as better property rights 
protection than French civil law countries.  
 
3.3. Methodology  
This section describes the data and variables used in this study. The study covers a selection of 15 stock 
markets in Africa, over the period 2003 to 2007. The selection criterion was based wholly on data 
availability of the selected variables. The selected countries are Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia. 
 
3.3.1 Data and variable description 
The dependent variable in this study is stock market liquidity. Stock market liquidity is measured as the 
total shares traded on the stock market divided by GDP. According to Levine and Zervos (1998), value 
traded measures trading volume as a share of national output and should positively reflect liquidity on 
an economy-wide basis.  They found that stock market liquidity - as measured by the value of trading 
relative to the size of the economy- to be positively and significantly correlated with current and future 
rates of capital accumulation and productivity growth. Furthermore, while not a direct measure of 
trading costs or the uncertainty associated with trading on a particular exchange, theoretical models of 
stock market liquidity and long run growth directly motivate value traded (Levine, 1991; Bencivenga et 
al., 1995). Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators online database (World Bank 
2008). 
 
In order to measure business regulation, three indicators considered relevant to stock market growth were 
selected from the „Doing Business‟ database (World Bank, 2008a). This is a database of business 
regulations that was created by the World Bank in 2003. The indicators measure how regulation helps 
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or hampers business performance in 181 countries and in 10 areas
11
 of everyday business activity. The 
data are based on the studies of laws and regulations obtained from surveys that are administered 
through local lawyers, government practitioners and accountants. The indicators are considered to 
provide a more precise and objective measure of business regulation than any other available 
perception-based measures of institutions. The indicators selected for the analysis are divided into 
three, broad categories. These include property rights (procedures to enforce a contract), investor 
protection (the investor protection index and legal rights index) and the level of business regulation 
(measured as the number of procedures required to start a business). 
 
Property rights: The number of procedures required to enforce a contract is an indicator of judicial 
efficiency. This variable measures the number of procedures required to resolve a commercial dispute 
before domestic or local courts. In measuring this variable it is assumed that the plaintiff takes all the 
required steps for prompt enforcement of judgement. In addition it is also assumed that the case 
represents a lawful transaction between businesses located in the country‟s most populous city. Fewer 
procedures to enforce a contract imply that the courts are efficient and therefore it is simple to enforce 
a contract while more procedures imply the contrary (Djankov et al., 2003). In addition, according to 
LLSV (1999), the efficiency of the judiciary is associated with larger stock markets in terms of market 
capitalisation. The estimated coefficient of this variable is expected to be negatively associated with 
stock market liquidity.  
 
Investor protection index measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against directors‟ misuse 
of corporate assets for personal gain. This indicator value is the average of three sub-indicators that 
measure transparency of transactions, liability of self-dealing, and shareholders‟ ability to sue officers 
for misconduct. In measuring this variable, it is assumed that the business is a publically traded 
corporation listed on the country‟s most important stock exchange and that it is a food manufacturer. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating better investor protection. The legal rights 
                                                 
11
 These include: starting a business, dealing with licences, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. 
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index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders, and thus facilitate lending. The index includes seven aspects related to legal rights in collateral 
law and three aspects in bankruptcy law. A score of 1 is assigned to each feature. The index ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to 
access credit. The coefficients of both variables are expected to be positively associated with stock 
market liquidity since greater investor protection enhances stock market growth (LLSV, 1997). 
 
To measure the level of business regulation, the indicator that measures business entry regulation is used. 
This indicator measures the number of procedures that are officially required by an entrepreneur to 
start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. These include obtaining all the 
necessary licences and permits and completing any required notifications and verifications for the 
company and employees with relevant authorities. In the analysis, this indicator represents the overall 
burden of business regulations on firm efficiency. The number of procedures is recorded in absolute 
values with a higher number implying a higher burden of business regulation. The coefficient of this 
variable is expected to be negatively associated with stock market liquidity. 
 
Five control variables – income, domestic savings, stock market size, financial intermediary 
development and inflation – are included in this study. The data for all these variables were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators online database (World Bank, 2008a). Income has been found 
to be a significant determinant of stock market activity, because higher income is usually associated 
with better institutions, larger and more active stock markets. The income level is measured as the 
GDP per capita in US dollars of a country and the coefficient of this variable is expected to be 
positively associated with stock market liquidity (Garcia & Liu, 1999). In order to measure 
macroeconomic stability current inflation is used –. Boyd, Levine & Smith (2001) show that higher levels 
of inflation are associated with smaller, less active and less efficient stock markets. It is argued that 
greater macroeconomic stability is an incentive for firms and investors to participate in the stock 
market. The coefficients of these variables are expected to be negatively associated with stock market 
 38 
liquidity. Inflation is measured by the rate of change in the consumer price index. Financial intermediary 
development is considered to be a significant determinant of stock market development in Africa (Yartey 
& Adjasi, 2007). It is argued that deepening of the formal financial system can result in more efficient 
intermediaries and growth of the stock market. At the aggregate level, it is suggested that if financial 
intermediaries provide a complimentary service to issuers of new equity such as underwriters, then the 
development of the banking system will be positively associated with the development of stock markets 
(Arestis et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1996). In this study to measure financial depth, domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector (M3) as a proportion of GDP is used. Stock market size is 
positively correlated with the ability to mobilise capital and diversify risk on an economy-wide basis. It 
is measured as the ratio of the total value of listed shares divided by GDP The more liquid the stock 
market is, the larger the amount of saving that is channelled through the stock market (Levine, 1991). 
Therefore, stock market size will be positively associated with stock market liquidity. Finally, savings are 
also included since there is evidence to suggest that higher domestic savings in a country enhance 
capital flows through the stock market (Garcia & Liu, 1999). Therefore savings would be positively 
associated with stock market liquidity. 
 
Legal origin: The legal origin is included in this study because there is evidence in the literature to show 
that it influences the legal system of a country. According to LLSV (1998), the legal tradition implanted 
in countries through the occupation or colonisation by European powers profoundly shaped national 
approaches to property rights protection and the degree to which those countries adapt to 
socioeconomic changes. It is also suggested that institutions are endogenous and therefore reflect 
various historical and cultural influences. In order to control for endogeneity among the business 
regulatory variables, the legal origin will be used. The legal origin is used as an instrument to extract the 
exogenous component of regulations. Econometrically, it is argued that the legal origin is a valid 
instrument to control the causal effect of the legal framework on financial development (Levine et al., 
2000).  Legal origin dummy: English legal origin equals 1 if the country has an English common law 
tradition and 0 if the country has a French civil law tradition as defined by the origin of each country‟s 
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commercial/company law (LLSV, 1998). According to Beck et al., (2003), English common law 
countries have significantly better developed financial intermediaries and markets and better property 
rights protection than French civil law countries. The legal origin was obtained from Botero et al., 
(2004) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book (2008). Table 3.1 shows the 
descriptive summary statistics.  
 
3.3.2.  Analytical framework 
This study employs a panel regression model. Since the sample size small and period is short this 
approach pools the data, which increases the degree of freedom and therefore provides more efficient 
estimates. It is also enables the control of individual heterogeneity of the sample units. The basic 
framework for the analysis is in the form of the following regression equation: 
 
 =                                                                                                                ...(3.1) 
 
Panel data estimation is susceptible to heteroscedasticity. There was evidence to confirm the presence 
of heteroscedasticity among the error terms, see Tables B.4. and B.5 in Appendix B. This problem was 
fixed by using White‟s heteroscedasticity-consistent variances and standard errors. In this analysis the 
Prais–Winsten estimator, that is a generalised least squares (GLS) estimator, is used. The purpose of 
using this estimator is that it preserves the first observations in a sample, which is advantageous for 
small samples. It also generates efficient and consistent estimates in the presence of serial correlation 
among the disturbance terms.  
 
3.3.3.  Empirical model specification 
The empirical model is based on that of La Porta, et al., (1997) and Levine and Zervos (1998) with 
some modifications. The modifications of the model involve the inclusion of other regulatory variables 
that are not captured in the model they used. Therefore, the model is specified as follows;  
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                                                                              ...(3.2) 
 
is the value stock traded as a share of GDP of country i = 1,…,15 and in year t = 1,...,5.   
represents a selection of business regulation variables. To ensure the robustness of the model,   
represents a selection of control variables and  is the error term. To further ensure the robustness 
of the model, a number of control variables were included to minimise specification bias. The 
coefficients   are the parameters of interest.  
 
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 3.1 above shows an average investor protection index value of 
4.9, which is below the median index value of 5. According to the index, this indicates that minority 
shareholders‟ rights, on average, are not well protected from directors‟ misuse of corporate assets. The 
average legal rights index of 6.68 is above the median index value of 5, which shows that the rights of 
borrowers and lenders are better protected by collateral and bankruptcy laws. 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive summary statistics (Full Sample) 
 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Business entry regulation 10.45 3.08 6 18 
Investor protection index 4.95 1.56 2 8 
Borrowers and lenders rights index 6.68 2.22 3 10 
Contract enforcement 37.65 4.24 29 44 
Market capitalisation as % of GDP 40.84 60.20 0.72 294.53 
Stock market liquidity 10.54 27.33 0.0011 150.44 
Inflation 8.04 5.00 0.98 26.67 
Income  1584.49 1460.36 134 4709 
Financial intermediary development 49.43 49.95 -16.35 197.59 
Savings 17.77 12.10 -3.44 52.43 
 
The average market size (capitalisation) to GDP ratios across the sample was 40 per cent and shows 
that African stock markets are small. In addition there is a huge gap between these markets with the 
minimum value of 0.72 for Uganda and a maximum of 294.53 for South Africa. The Johannesburg 
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Stock Exchange has about 66.2 per cent of the combined market capitalisation of the selected 
countries. The average stocks traded as a percentage of GDP of 10.5per cent shows that these stock 
markets have low liquidity especially when compared with other developing economies like Brazil – 
22.2 per cent, Malaysia – 50.4 per cent or Thailand – 56 per cent (See Table B.3 – Appendix B). The 
minimum value of 0.0011 recorded in Swaziland shows that there is virtually no trading as compared to 
the maximum value of 150.44 for South Africa. Furthermore, additional analysis by legal origin (Table 
B.1 and B.3 – Appendix B) shows that countries with French legal traditions have on average much 
lower investor protection (4.37), and weaker collateral and bankruptcy laws (index scores of 5) 
compared to countries of English legal tradition (5.46 and 8.15 respectively). There is, however, no 
significant difference in judicial efficiency as measured by the enforcing contracts variables between 
these two legal tradition countries. Lastly the average market size is lower among countries with French 
legal traditions (34.64) compared to countries of English legal tradition (46.7).  
 
3.4.2. Regression results 
The results in Table 3.2 below show the effect of a selection of business regulatory variables on stock 
market development for an unbalanced panel of 15 markets12 over the period 2003-2007. Prais -
Winsten regression estimates are generated for all the specifications of the model specified in equation 
(3.2). Regression 1 results show the level of business regulation is not a significant determinant of stock 
market development in this sample of countries. The estimated coefficient for minority shareholders‟ 
rights is significant at a 5 per cent level and with the predicted sign. This result implies that greater 
protection of minority shareholders‟ rights enhances stock market activity or liquidity and is consistent 
with a priori expectations (LLSV 1997, 1998). A one standard-deviation increase (an improvement) in 
the investor protection index is associated with an increase in stock market activity by 3.216 percentage 
points. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for the borrowers‟ and lenders‟ legal rights index is 
significant and positively associated with stock market liquidity. 
 Table 3.2: Regression Results 
                                                 
12 South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Botswana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritius, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi. 
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Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-statistic are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10% 
 
The estimated effect of both investor protection variables is hugely significant and corroborates the 
findings of La Porta et al., (1997). The estimated coefficient for judicial efficiency measured by the 
contract enforcement variable is insignificant although it had the predicted sign. This result is 
inconsistent with a priori expectation since one would expect that increased efficiency in contract 
enforcement would enhance investors‟ confidence in the existence and enforcement of property rights. 
However, as highlighted earlier in this document, there is evidence to suggest that courts, especially in 
developing economies, lack adequate resources to operate efficiently therefore making enforcement of 
private contracts costly. As a result, firms in developing economies use alternative channels to resolve 
disputes – like arbitration or informal courts (Botero et al., 2003). The estimated coefficients for four of 
the control variables included were significant and with the predicted sign. The results show that larger 
stock markets, higher income, banking sector development and a stable macroeconomic environment 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent Variable: Value of stock traded as a % of GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Level of business regulation 0.02643 
(4.24) 
0.03011 
(4.28) 
0.02055 
(3.13) 
0.02632 
(3.60) 
Investor protection     
Minority shareholders‟ rights 0.02063 
(1.58)** 
0.25224 
(1.87)* 
0.06209 
(2.85)* 
0.06134 
(3.33)** 
Borrower and lender rights 0.04389 
(3.66)* 
0.04321 
(3.95)** 
0.01819 
(2.23)** 
0.01748 
(2.09)** 
Property rights     
Contract enforcement -0.00811 
(-1.25) 
-0.00819 
(-0.94) 
-0.00211 
(-0.37)* 
-0.00184 
(-0.24)* 
 
                           Stock market size 1.12760 
(6.57)*** 
1.03480 
(5.68)*** 
0.98410 
(4.23)** 
0.99810 
(7.15)** 
         Banking sector development 0.00579 
(7.61)** 
0.00625 
(7.90)** 
0.00563 
(8.10)** 
0.00621 
(8.43)** 
Income 0.02373 
(1.48) 
0.07893 
(0.43) 
0.09325 
(3.57)** 
0.07203 
(3.21)* 
Inflation -0.00389 
(-1.43)* 
-0.00595 
(-1.75)* 
-0.00394 
(-1.48)* 
-0.00585 
(-1.96)* 
Savings  0.00248 
(0.94)* 
 0.00463 
(1.94) * 
French legal origin   -2.28200 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.30433 
(-5.27)*** 
Constant -0.38974 
(-1.27) 
-0.46561 
(-1.05) 
-0.15242 
(-0.51) 
-0.44827 
(-1.02) 
R-squared 
 
0.8379 0.8445 0.8552 0.8639 
Wald chi2 (8)41.83 
[0.0000] 
(9)33.72 
[0.0000] 
(9)43.99 
[0.0000] 
(10)35.57 
[0.0000] 
 
Observations 
 
70 
 
65 
 
70 
 
65 
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are associated with greater stock market liquidity. In addition the results confirm those of previous 
studies, that the existence of well-developed financial intermediaries is important for the growth of 
stock markets in Africa (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996).  
 
The estimated coefficients obtained in column (2) are similar to those obtained in column (1). The 
results confirm that both the level of business regulation and the efficiency of the judicial system are 
not significant determinants of stock market activity in Africa. The significance of the estimated 
coefficient for the borrowers‟ and lenders‟ legal rights index confirms that better designed collateral and 
bankruptcy laws are significant in facilitating lending and enhancing stock market liquidity. The 
estimated coefficient obtained for the protection of minority shareholders‟ rights is only significant at a 
10 per cent level of significance. Given that the data for this indicator is obtained from a survey that is 
based on company laws and securities regulations, these results possibly imply that corporate 
governance rules and securities regulations are not well established or enforced in these economies. 
Another possible reason for this result could be the potential endogeneity of some of the variables. 
Therefore the next section presents the result when the legal origin is included as an instrumental 
variable to control for endogenous bias. Lastly, the results show that a stable macroeconomic 
environment, well-developed financial intermediaries, higher income and domestic savings increase 
market liquidity.  
 
The legal origin was included in columns (3) and (4) (Table 3.2). The estimated coefficients obtained in 
columns (3) and (4) confirm that the level of business regulation does not influence stock market 
activity. Although weakly significant at a 10 per cent level of significance, the efficiency of the judicial 
system enhances stock market growth. In addition, the results confirm that investor protection is 
important for stock market liquidity. Furthermore, countries that adopted French legal traditions have 
less liquid stock markets compared to those of English legal traditions. These results corroborate the 
findings of La Porta et al., (1997), and Beck et al., (2003) that found English legal tradition countries to 
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have significantly better developed financial intermediaries and markets and better property rights 
protection than countries with French legal traditions.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of the business regulation on stock market 
liquidity – that is used as a robust predicator of capital accumulation and productivity growth. The 
analysis was carried out using a sample of 15 stock markets in Africa with data from the „Doing 
Business‟ database over the period 2003 to 2007. The results from the panel data analysis showed that 
the overall government regulation does not influence stock market liquidity. However, the results 
confirm those obtained in previous studies that greater protection of investors‟ rights, vis-à-vis minority 
shareholders‟ rights and borrower and lenders‟ rights, enhances stock market activity. This means that 
better designed collateral and bankruptcy laws that protect the rights of borrowers and lenders enhance 
stock market liquidity. There was anecdotal evidence to suggest that improved judicial efficiency 
influences stock market activity. The legal origin was found to have a significant effect on the legal 
system of a country. Countries that adopted French legal traditions had significantly less active stock 
markets than countries that adopted English legal traditions. In the case of countries with French legal 
origin, they were found to have narrower stock markets as well as less investor and property rights 
protection. These results confirm that property rights and investor protection are important 
determinants of the investment.  
 
These findings have important policy implications for stock markets in Africa. Firstly, the evidence 
suggests that investor protection is important in enhancing stock market activity. Therefore, radical 
reforms in strengthening legal rules-like bankruptcy laws- could provide greater confidence in the legal 
system Secondly, contract enforcement is important for the development of stock markets. To improve 
judicial efficiency especially with regard to commercial disputes, African economies can strengthen 
statutory guidelines that govern arbitration since this is a faster channel for dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, establishing or strengthening the capacity of specific courts that deal only with 
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commercial disputes – like commercial courts – would hasten commercial dispute resolution since 
plaintiffs would avoid the lengthy delays in magistrate or high courts. Lastly, the results obtained offer 
opportunities for further investigation with a larger number of institutional variables that influence 
stock market liquidity. 
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CHAPTER 4: EFFECT OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, BUSINESS 
REGULATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE ON INVESTMENT IN 29 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
 
4.1. Introduction 
The disproportionate level of economic prosperity among countries has long been an issue of 
controversy in economic history. Over the past five decades, countries have adopted and adapted 
numerous strategies to enhance income and economic growth, with various outcomes. Countries like 
South Korea and Singapore, which were lagging behind economically before the 1960s, were able to 
experience phenomenal investment growth until the 1990s, while economies like Ghana and Uganda 
lagged behind. Other countries, like Botswana and South Africa, have received a consistent flow of 
foreign investment over the past three decades, while Lesotho and Zambia, which have been relatively 
politically stable during the same time period, have not received comparable amounts. Economists 
attribute this disparity to numerous factors, like weak macroeconomic policies, unstable political 
environments, underdeveloped and poorly maintained infrastructure and, more recently, poor legal and 
regulatory frameworks (Ndulu & O‟Connell, 2008). 
 
The legal and regulatory systems of a country are vital constituents of its institutions, which are known 
to provide the structure for transactions that enable human interaction to be orderly. It is unanimously 
accepted that institutions play a role in enhancing economic outcomes. The question that is still 
unanswered, however, is the extent to which institutions contribute to investment. Is an efficient and 
effective legal and regulatory framework sufficient to support investment? Numerous empirical studies 
have been undertaken using different institutional measures (like property rights and regulation of 
entry) to answer these questions (Besley, 1995; Blanchard, 2004; Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer, 2002). The studies assert that developed economies regulate their activities better 
than underdeveloped economies. Even though there is evidence to show that firms in developing 
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economies have found effective substitutes for the lack of efficient regulation and inexpensive formal 
conflict resolution, as highlighted by Alexander Gerschenkron‟s classic proposition (Gerschenkron, 
1962), these structures have not stimulated significant economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa. This has 
been attributed to some extent to the unique social institutions and political environment of the African 
continent. In order to investigate this notion further, this chapter presents a comprehensive assessment 
of the effect of the level of business regulation, infrastructure development and the political 
environment on investment using 29 economies in Africa over a five-year period, from 2003 to 2007. 
Studies on the effect of regulation on the investment and growth of African economies are scanty and 
it is an area that is relatively under-researched. Using relatively new and objective measures of business 
regulation, as well as infrastructure development, corruption and political-risk indicators, this study 
seeks to extend the literature on the investment climate of African countries. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a discussion on the 
background literature. Section 4.3 contains a discussion on the research methodology. Section 4.4 
presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 summarises the findings of the 
research and draws conclusions. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
North (1990) defines institutions as humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and 
codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws and property rights). Although institutions had 
been acknowledged as factors essential to economic performance, it is only after the work of Ronald 
Coase (1937) that they came to prominence. According to North (1981), Coase‟s work raised a major 
criticism against the neoclassical paradigm, which had profound implications on economic theory. 
Since then, further studies – such as those by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Djankov, 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999) – on 
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institutions and their role in society have been carried out and, although there are varying outcomes and 
perspectives, there is general consensus that institutions do contribute to economic performance. 
 
Excessive regulation and bureaucratic red tape are often identified as a characteristic of inefficient 
institutions. According to Stone, Levy and Pardes (1996), in a comparative study of the legal and 
regulatory environment of Brazilian and Chilean garment firms, excessive regulation can create a 
generalised drag on all businesses or can favour some businesses over others, either as an intended 
consequence of implementation or as a result of the structure of the costs imposed by regulation. They 
furthermore assert that poor regulation not only adds to the cost of doing business but also increases 
uncertainty about returns from investment and individual transactions. Creating the optimal balance 
between regulation and economic performance has proved to be a challenge given that regulations are 
inherently part of a social system. Since regulation typically arises gradually over time, additional 
benefits are usually difficult to measure. Djankov et al., (2002) indicates that, for example, high-level 
entry regulation is associated with larger unofficial economies and with no measurable benefits for the 
quality of products or services produced. Furthermore, higher levels of regulation in the form of 
lengthy judicial procedures yield no benefits in simple disputes. In contrast, more regulated legal 
systems appear to cost more and to create more delays without offsetting benefits in terms of perceived 
justice (Djankov et al., 2003). 
 
It has been asserted that governments in Africa control directly a large part of the economic activity 
and are responsible for creating the climate in which other economic decisions are made (Ravenhill, 
1980). The political environment, therefore, has a very important impact on every business, no matter 
its size or area of operation. This includes all laws, government agencies and lobbying groups that 
influence or restrict individuals and organisations in society. An unstable political environment arises 
from activities and events (like corruption within government and among political élite) and internal 
conflict (like wars, civil disorder and political violence). Even though such events may not involve a 
change in government or take a violent form, they generate uncertainty about the stability of the 
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incumbent government and this influences its authority and effectiveness. In a cross-sectional study of 
31 countries, Fosu (2002) shows that abortive coups rather than successful coups had an adverse 
impact on economic outcomes over the 1960 to 1986 period. This study focuses on a narrow aspect of 
political instability referred to as „élite political instability‟13. More recent studies have broadened the 
definition of political instability to include all kinds of situations, activities and patterns of political 
behaviour that threaten to change or actually change a political system in a non-constitutional way 
(whether élite or communal events, peaceful or violent events). Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999), 
using the broader definition of political instability on a sample of 39 sub-Saharan countries from 1975 
to 1988, show that it had a significant and negative effect on capital accumulation in the region. The 
type of regime (military or civilian) has been found to influence the political process of a country. Even 
though numerous researchers have failed to discern the influence of a military or civilian regime on 
economic performance, there is a general consensus that the two types differ in the style of economic 
management (Looney, 1989). Military regimes are considered to be authoritarian and with weak roots in 
society. They are fragile and are characterised by a short life expectancy and susceptibility to internal 
political power struggles that result in violent regime changes. On the other hand civilian regimes are 
considered democratic and tend to root themselves in society through more developed networks. They 
have been found to last longer because they display a greater sense of cohesion (Pastor and Hilt, 1993). 
Jensen (2003) provides evidence to show that democratic governments attract high levels of foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  
 
Corruption is considered a threat to both foreign and domestic investment because it distorts the 
economic and financial environment. It is well documented that corruption reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability and therefore introduces an inherent instability into the political process. This argument is 
supported by Mauro (1995) who affirms that corruption hinders the efficiency of institutions and has a 
                                                 
13 „Élite political instability‟ is defined as the forceful removal of or an attempt or a plot to remove from office those in 
leadership positions in a given country (Morrison & Stevenson, 1971). Previous research shows that this is measured as the 
occurrence of coups d‟état, plots, political assassinations and purges (Barro, 1991; Fosu, 1992; Knack & Keefer, 1995). 
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negative effect on investment, even in sub-samples of countries in which bureaucratic regulation is very 
cumbersome. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), in their study on the effect of corruption on resource 
allocation, assert that corruption in the form of bribes is more costly than taxation and has the effect of 
encouraging monopolies, discouraging innovation and reducing foreign investment. They argue that, 
since corruption is usually illegal, efforts to avoid detection and punishment cause corruption to be 
more distortionary than taxation. Another study on a panel of 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
shows that both corruption and political instability have a negative effect on FDI (Asiedu, 2006). Habib 
and Zurawicki (2001) provide further evidence to show that not only does corruption hinder FDI but it 
also affects local domestic investment. 
 
Economic-infrastructure14 development in African economies has always been an area that has been 
heavily regulated and controlled mainly by government. As a result of limited private-sector investment, 
the condition of Africa‟s infrastructure is characterised by inadequate transport networks that are 
poorly maintained, with unreliable power that severely constrains output. There is theoretical evidence 
to show that good infrastructure favours the growth of firms by enhancing productivity and 
profitability (Dollar, Driemeier & Mengistae, 2005). In addition, poor infrastructure is found to increase 
the cost of doing business and is therefore a barrier to trade both within a country and with a country‟s 
neighbours. According to Limão and Venables (2001), poor infrastructure contributes to most of the 
dismal performance of intra-African trade and African countries‟ external trade. This study attributes 
this situation largely to very high transport costs within the continent. Although the literature does not 
show a direct relationship between investment rates and infrastructure development, empirical studies 
show significant evidence that infrastructure influences investment and economic growth through the 
productivity channel (Aschauer, 1989; Bougheas, Demetriades & Morgenroth, 1999). Interestingly, 
Asiedu (2002) does not find infrastructure to have an influence on FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
                                                 
14 In this study, „economic infrastructure‟ refers to physical facilities, such as roads, rail, ports, airports and communication 
facilities (mobile phones, the internet, etc.). 
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4.3. Methodology 
This section describes the data and variables used in the study. The analysis covers a selection of 29 
countries in Africa over the period 2003 to 2007. These countries were selected because they had data 
on variables considered in this study. The countries are Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
4.3.1. Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is investment measured as gross capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP. This economic variable has been used in previous studies as an indicator of investment within a 
country (Alesina et al., 2005). Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM 
(2008). 
 
Four variables were selected from a number of domestic-conflict, political-risk and corruption variables 
to measure political environment. These are corruption, revolutions, type of regime and the party-
fractionalisation index. 
 
To measure corruption, the corruption-perception index (CPI) from Transparency International is used. 
This index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). There are 
drawbacks to using perception-based indicators, especially the CPI. It is considered that indicators 
measuring perceived corruption levels are highly correlated with investment, since investment decisions 
are made on the basis of perceptions. It is, however, the most comprehensive index on corruption that 
covers almost all countries in Africa. It is also considered a benchmark indicator and has been used in 
numerous empirical studies (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Corruption is included in this 
study because it is considered to be an institutional factor that has a direct impact on policy uncertainty. 
 52 
In a number of developing economies, the political élite benefit economically through corruption and 
this has triggered political and social unrest in some instances. 
 
Revolutions are measured as the number of illegal or forced changes in top government élite and any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion with the aim of being independent from central 
government. Revolutions are expected have a negative coefficient. The party-fractionalisation index is 
based on a formula proposed by Douglas Rae (1968) and is measured as 
                                                                                                                ...(4.1) 
 
where t is the proportion of members of legislature associated with the ith political party. 
Fractionalisation is expected to have a negative coefficient, as increased fractionalisation may either 
create opportunities for military involvement in political matters or create greater frustration and 
uncertainty among the public about the ruling political system or government (Gyimah-Brempong & 
Traynor, 1999). Type of regime refers to a country‟s political process. This indicator consists of three 
categories with a 1: for civilian, which refers to a government controlled by a non-military component 
of a country‟s population. 2: military–civilian is outwardly civilian but is controlled by military elite. 3: 
military regime is one in which direct rule is by the military.  A civilian regime in this study is 
considered to be the most favourable in that it is less prone to political instability while the least 
favourable is a military regime that fosters an environment of considerable uncertainty. A larger 
number of political risk variables were considered but they were not highly correlated and subsequently 
generated a low score (0.49) on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. Factor 
analysis or principal-component analysis could therefore not be used to create a composite political-
environment index, as previous studies have done (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Gyimah-Brempong & 
Traynor, 1999). The three variables were selected because they had sufficient data points during the 
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sample period. The data for the three variables were obtained from the Cross National Time Series 
Data Archive.15 
 
In order to measure infrastructure, the number of fixed telephones lines per 1 000 people is used. This 
variable was chosen because it is available for all the countries in the sample. According to the 
literature, a good measure of infrastructure should take into account both its availability and its 
reliability. The infrastructure variable that captures the reliability aspect of telecommunication would 
be, for example, the number of times that telephone lines are inoperative (Asiedu, 2006). These data are 
not, however, available for most of the countries in this sample. Data were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM (2008). 
To measure the level of business regulation, three sub-indicators from the „Doing Business‟ database are 
used. This is a database of business regulations that was created by the World Bank in 2003. The 
indicators measure how regulations help or hinder business performance in 181 countries and in 10 
regulatory areas16. The data are based on the studies of laws and regulations and surveys of local 
lawyers, government practitioners and accountants. The indicators are considered to provide a more 
precise and objective measure of business environment than any other available perception-based 
measures of institutions. The sub-indicators used in this study are the number of procedures required 
to start a business, to register a commercial property and to transfer ownership of property. The 
number of procedures for each variable is recorded in absolute values, with a higher number implying a 
higher burden of business regulation. A business-regulation index is obtained as the simple average of 
the values of each sub-indicator. Because the selected sub-indicators represent the bureaucratic hurdles 
in the execution of these transactions, the simple average of these variables is considered to be a 
reasonable proxy for the level of business regulation. The coefficient is expected to be negatively 
associated with investment. 
                                                 
15 More information is available at www.databanksinternational.com. 
16
 These include starting a business, dealing with licences, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. 
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Other control variables added include the inflation rate (which is a measure of macro-economic 
stability), the percentage of adults who are literate as a measure of human capital and GDP growth used 
as a measure of the size of the economy (which is included as the log GDP of a country). The data for 
all these variables was obtained from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2008). Table C.1 
(Appendix C) shows the summary descriptive statistics. 
 
4.3.2. Analytical framework 
This study employs a panel regression model. Panel data techniques have numerous advantages over 
cross-sectional and times series methods. Panel data are better able to identify and measure the effects 
that are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data (Greene, 2003). In addition 
according to Baltagi (2008), panel data may eliminate biases resulting from the aggregation of countries 
or firms.  The basic framework for the analysis is in the form of the following regression equation: 
 
                                                                                          ...(4.2) 
 
Where i = 1....N; t= 1...T, with i denoting the cross-sectional dimension, countries, and t representing 
the time series.  is the constant, β is Kx1, xit is the i
th country on K explanatory variables and  is 
the error term.  
 
In order to test serial correlation, a Lagrange multiplier test (LM test statistic) is used. If the calculated 
LM value exceeds the critical LM value then the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected and 
serial correlation is present. Serial correlation can be corrected by using the Prais-Winsten 
transformation. Panel data estimation is also susceptible to heteroscedasticity. This can be corrected by 
using the White cross-section coefficient covariance method to correct for standard errors (Baltagi, 
2008).See Tables 4.6to 4.9 for before and after correction tests.  
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4.3.3. Empirical model specification 
The hypotheses tested in this study are that an unstable political environment decreases investment and 
that higher levels of business regulation and infrastructure development decrease investment in Africa. 
The mechanism through which regulation affects aggregate economic performance is not clear and 
there are therefore no well-developed theories. There is, however, a common view intrinsic to 
numerous studies of regulation and the effect of regulation on economic performance called the 
Schumpeterian process of „creative destruction‟ (Loayza, Ovieda & Servén, 2004). According to Joseph 
Schumpeter, innovative entry by entrepreneurs is the force that sustains long-term economic growth, 
even as it destroys the value of established companies that enjoy some degree of monopoly power. 
Caballero and Hammour (1996) furthermore provide evidence to show that creative destruction driven 
by experimentation and the adoption of new products and processes when investment is sunk is a core 
mechanism of development. In other words, obstacles like excessive regulatory barriers that disrupt the 
process of resource allocation tend to cause deterioration in aggregate economic performance by 
allowing low-productivity activities to survive longer and discourage the adoption of new high-
productivity activities. It has also been asserted that underdeveloped and politicised institutions are a 
major impediment to a well-functioning creative destruction process and they result in sluggish 
creation, technological stagnation and spurious reallocation of resources. Evidence from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries shows that the shift of resources 
away from less productive to more efficient production units forms much of the observed growth in 
aggregate productivity (Ahn, 2001; Haltiwanger, 2000). 
 
Evidence from the literature shows that social and political instability affects investment through a 
number of channels. Firstly, social and political unrest cause the disruption of productive activities, 
which results in a reduction of the productivity of labour and capital. Secondly, it increases uncertainty, 
thereby leading investors to postpone projects, to shift their assets from fixed capital to more liquid or 
speculative forms or to invest abroad (Alesina & Perrotti, 1996). 
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The effect of the type of regime on investment may also be captured through the political instability 
channel. Military regimes that are usually characterised by an autocratic style of leadership are more 
susceptible to rebellion and therefore create uncertainty about the stability of government. On the 
other hand, civilian regimes that are considered to embrace a democratic style of governance create an 
environment that reduces the extent of political, social and economic uncertainty. Corruption, on the 
other hand, influences investment through a number of channels. One of these is the time-consuming 
activities that economic agents are involved in, like queuing for official documents in unauthorised 
offices and negotiating or paying bribes to officials, which obstructs the efficient operations of firms 
and, ultimately, productivity. The theoretical literature shows that infrastructure helps in the mobility of 
resources, goods and services, thereby facilitating economic activity, which enhances additional 
productive opportunities. There is empirical evidence to show that good infrastructure, like roads, 
telephones and hydroelectric power, reduces production and transaction costs in developing economies 
(Eshafani & Ramirez, 2003). The evidence above largely suggests that these factors influence 
investment through the productivity channel. In order to capture the above relationships, we specify a 
parsimonious model of investment of the form: 
 
                                                                ...(4.3) 
 
 is the gross capital stock of country i = 1, . . ., 29 in year t = 1, . . .,5.   is a measure of the level 
of business regulation,  is a measure of the level of infrastructure development,  is a measure of 
the political environment and  is a set of control variables. is the composite-error term. The 
coefficients ,  are the parameters of interest. 
 
4.3.4. Endogenous bias 
In order to control for endogeneity of institutions, the instrumental variable approach is used. Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi, (2004) assert that institutions are endogenous. Therefore any correlation 
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between institutions and economic variables may reflect these underlying influences and not 
institutions themselves. Endogenous bias may arise because countries with higher income may engage 
in more investment than others. It is argued in the literature that countries with rising or high incomes 
are more likely to have better regulatory environments. Statistically the use of instrumental variable 
techniques provides one method of dealing with the endogeneity problem. Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson (2001) use mortality rates of colonial settlers as an instrument for institutional quality, Hall 
and Jones (1999) use the fraction of the population speaking English and western European languages 
also as an instrument for institutional quality. To instrument the regulation variables the legal origin is 
used. There is growing evidence to suggest that the legal tradition implanted in countries by European 
colonialists has profoundly shaped national approaches to property rights protection and the degree to 
which the state intervenes in the economy (La Porta et al., 1998). Legal origin dummy: English legal origin 
equals 1 if the country has an English common law tradition and 0 if the country has a French civil law 
tradition as defined by the origin of each country‟s commercial/company law (La Porta et al., 1999). 
According to La Porta et al., (1998) and Beck et al., (2002), French civil law was developed to unify the 
legal system, prevent jurisprudence, and solidify state control of the courts. By contrast, English 
common law evolved to protect property owners from state control. Beck et al., (2002) show that 
countries with French legal origins tend to have lower levels of property rights protection than 
countries with English origins after controlling for many other factors, including natural resource 
endowments. The legal origin was obtained from Botero et al., (2004) and the Central Intelligence 
Agency World Fact Book.  
 
4.4. Empirical results 
The empirical results presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the effect of infrastructure development, 
political environment and the level of business regulation on investment for an unbalanced panel of 29 
countries over the period 2003 to 2007. Prais-Winsten regression estimates are generated for all the 
specifications of the model specified in equation (4.3). Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the effect of the 
explanatory variables on investment, measured as the gross-capital formation and private-capital 
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formation as a percentage of GDP, respectively. Even though corruption is a political-environment 
variable, it is considered to be an institutional factor and is therefore included in all specifications. Since 
three political-risk indicators are used in this study, the results are presented in three separate columns. 
Column (1) reports results with type of regime and columns (2) and (3) report results with revolutions 
and party fractionalisation, respectively. 
 
The results in column (1) show that most of the explanatory variables are significant, although not with 
the predicted signs. The coefficient for corruption is positive and significant, which is consistent with 
both the theory and the empirical literature (Mauro, 1995). The results show that a one standard-
deviation increase of the corruption index increases investment by 5.3 per cent. A higher index implies 
that the perception of corruption in government is low. 
 
The type of regime has a positive and significant effect on investment.  The result suggests that during 
this sample period, civilian–military regimes and military regimes in Africa were better in promoting 
investment than civilian regimes. Possibly civilian–military regimes and military regimes during this 
sample period had economic styles of management that favoured public and private investment better 
than civilian regimes. However, this result will be investigated further in the subsequent analysis.  
 
Infrastructure is found to be significant at a 5 per cent level, although with a negative sign, which 
contradicts most empirical studies. There is evidence, however, to show that if infrastructure 
development is driven mainly by public investment, it sometimes has a negative effect on private-
capital formation. According to the complementarity hypothesis, public investment undertaken by 
heavily subsidised and inefficient state-owned enterprises in some sectors of the economy has, more 
often than not, reduced the possibility of private investment, especially if the markets in which these 
investments are made are highly protected (Miguel, 2007). The level of business regulation was found 
to be insignificant and positively associated to investment. This result is inconsistent with the findings 
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of Djankov et al., (2002) and Dawson (2006). Column (2) shows that revolutions have a negative but 
insignificant effect on investment. 
Table 4.1: Regression Results – Aggregate Investment 
 
Dependent variable: Total gross-capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Level of business regulation 0.01739 
(0.09) 
0.04811 
(0.23) 
-0.09461 
(-0.41) 
Infrastructure( Lag-1) -1.40700 
(-2.44)** 
-1.09507 
(-1.95)* 
-1.04846 
(-1.85) 
Political environment    
Corruption 5.16052 
(4.96)*** 
4.92703 
(4.75)*** 
4.75425 
(4.71)*** 
Type of regime 5.24172 
(3.01)*** 
  
Revolutions  -0.53794 
(-0.72) 
 
Party fractionalization   -0.00040 
(-1.97)* 
Inflation 0.08035 
(0.14) 
0.05475 
(0.10) 
0.00941 
(0.02) 
Literacy 0.07184 
(1.20) 
0.09372 
(1.25)* 
0.10423 
(1.81)* 
Income 2.16389 
(4.04) 
2.04853 
(3.79)*** 
1.89529 
(3.47)*** 
Constant -16.56092 
(-1.84) 
-11.69047 
(-1.31) 
-5.49393 
(-0.58) 
R-Squared 0.7963 0.7726 0.7846 
No. of obs 105 105 105 
Test of probability Wald Chi2(7)=31.88 
[0.0000] 
Wald Chi2(7)=34.75 
[0.0000] 
Wald Chi2(7)=39.37 
[0.0000] 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-statistic are in parentheses and probability values are in square 
brackets. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
 
Given that there were a number of revolutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, 
Chad, Cote d‟Ivoire, Mauritania, Nigerian, Rwanda and Sudan during the sample period, this result 
contradicts the notion that small disruptions in the political environment create uncertainty about the 
stability and effectiveness of government, which influences perceptions and the marginal product of 
capital (Devereaux & Wen, 1996; Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor 1996; 1999). Column (3) shows that 
party fractionalisation has a significant and negative effect on investment. The result confirms the 
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findings of Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor, (1999). All three columns show that corruption is highly 
significant. The level of business regulation is insignificant in all specifications (in columns 1, 2 and 3) 
and with the wrong predicted sign in columns (1) and (2).  
 
The results presented in Table 4.1 are inconclusive and the alternative of investigating the effect of the 
explanatory variables on private and public-capital formation is therefore considered appropriate. The 
results are largely insignificant in all specifications when public-capital formation is used as the 
dependent variable and they are therefore not presented. Table 4.2 presents the results with the 
dependent variable as private-capital formation. Similarly, the results are presented in three separate 
columns with one political-risk variable included independently. Column (1) reports the results with the 
type of regime included, and columns (2), and (3) show the results for revolutions and party 
fractionalisation respectively. The results with private-capital formation are more interesting. In all 
specifications, the level of business regulation is not significant, implying that the level of business 
regulation does not affect investment. This result contradicts the theory and theoretical foundation of 
the proxy indicator – the number of procedures to start a business or to register a business or property 
– that is used as a measure of the level of business regulation. According to the source,17 more 
procedures are synonymous with many bureaucratic hurdles, which are indicative of heavier business 
regulation. This result may, however, be due to endogenous bias and will be controlled for in the next 
section. The one-period lagged infrastructure-development estimates were highly significant in all cases 
and had an unpredicted sign. The level of corruption in all specifications was highly significant and had 
the predicted sign. A one standard-deviation increase in the corruption index increases private 
investment by an average of 4.8 per cent. The effect of the type of regime is significant at a 5 per cent 
level and has a negative effect on private capital formation. The results show that military regimes and 
civilian–military regimes create a less favourable environment for private investment than civilian 
regimes. The party-fractionalisation index is insignificant, which shows that, even if the political system 
may be highly fractionalised, this does not create uncertainty about the effectiveness of the ruling party 
                                                 
17 The World Bank „Doing Business‟ project. 
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or current government. In an environment where social institutions are considered weak, opposition 
parties seldom influence existing or new government policies because they are small or highly 
fractionalised and therefore lack political clout. The coefficient for revolutions is insignificant. The 
income and literacy rate are both significant in all specifications. 
 
One factor that may cause biased estimates and that has not been addressed yet is endogeneity. Table 
4.3, columns (4), (5) and (6), therefore show the results with the instrumental variable. The dependent 
variable is private-capital formation and the political-risk variables are included independently with type 
of regime in column (4) and revolutions and party fractionalisation in columns (5) and (6), respectively. 
 
Table 4.2: Regression Results – Private Investment 
 
 
Dependent variable: Private-capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level of business 
regulation       
0.02580 
(0.24) 
-0.01767 
(-0.18) 
-0.01338 
(-0.11) 
-0.40354 
(-2.22)** 
-0.46441 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.42839 
(-2.40) 
Infrastructure   
 
-1.59789 
(-3.48)*** 
-1.91531 
(-4.79)*** 
-1.89398 
(-4.72)*** 
-1.44085 
(-3.60)*** 
-1.64936 
(-4.60)*** 
-1.61956 
(-4.21)*** 
Political 
environment 
      
Corruption 4.56486 
(7.15)*** 
4.71587 
(7.33)*** 
4.68496 
(7.20)*** 
3.91846 
(6.00)*** 
4.04789 
(6.40)*** 
4.08885 
(6.21)*** 
Type of regime                              -4.08014
(-0.12)** 
  -2.81647 
(-1.85)*** 
  
Revolutions  0.19009 
(0.31) 
  0.26307 
(0.37) 
 
Party 
fractionalisation                                                                         
  -0.01901 
(0.04) 
  0.00012 
(0.58) 
Inflation -0.36621 
(-1.13) 
-0.24784 
(-0.77) 
-0.26005 
(-0.79) 
-1.05844 
(-3.14)** 
-1.00403 
(-2.96)** 
-0.97631 
(-2.81)** 
Literacy 0.06060 
(2.34)** 
0.05011 
(2.02)* 
0.05159 
(2.06)* 
0.12606 
(3.89)*** 
0.12340 
(3.72)** 
0.12985 
(3.88)** 
Income 1.45113 
(3.50)*** 
1.66487 
(4.48)*** 
1.65987 
(4.60)*** 
0.93956 
(2.10)** 
1.06553 
(2.59)*** 
5.76192 
(4.62)*** 
Legal origin     5.42370 
(4.81)*** 
5.57695 
(4.85)*** 
11.35273 
(2.42)** 
Constant -3.68526 
(-0.70) 
-8.20437 
(-1.82)* 
-8.23684 
(-1.59) 
5.97719 
(1.08) 
3.32764 
(0.64) 
1.56991 
(0.27) 
R-Squared                                     0.7700 0.7682 0.7681 0.8217 0.8133 0.8055 
No. of obs.                                      105 105 105 105 105 105 
Test of prob.              Wald Chi2(7)= 
174.33[0.0000] 
Chi2(7)=82.63 
[0.0000] 
Chi2(7)=80.30 
[0.0000] 
Chi2(8)=301.03 
[0.0000] 
Chi2(8)=118.71 
[0.0000] 
Chi2(8)=199.88
[0.0000] 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-statistic are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. 
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The estimated coefficients obtained after controlling for endogeneity through the use of legal origin as 
an instrument are statistically stronger. The level of business regulation is highly significant and has the 
predicted sign in all three specifications. This result implies that the level of business regulation 
influences private investment, which is consistent with previous empirical studies (Djankov et al., 2002). 
In addition, the effect of corruption and the type of regime on private investment is negative and 
significant even after controlling for effect of infrastructure development and the level of business 
regulation. These results confirm those obtained earlier in the empirical analysis, even though the 
estimated magnitudes of the coefficients for the political-environment variables are marginally lower. 
The coefficient for the single lag of infrastructure development is highly significant and negative, which 
strongly suggests that there could be inaccuracies in the measures of infrastructure development. It is 
well established that well developed infrastructure enhances private sector investments in current and 
subsequent periods. The legal origin is significant in all specifications. This result shows that countries 
with English common law tradition have higher investment than those with French civil law tradition. 
This result is consistent with a priori expectation. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effect of the level of business regulation, infrastructure 
and political environment on the level of investment in Africa. Using a five-year (2003 to 2007) panel-
data set of 29 countries in Africa and a broad number of political and social-institution variables, the 
results provide evidence that both corruption and the political environment directly affect investment, 
even after endogeneity is controlled for. The estimates generated also confirm that the level of business 
regulation measured by the „Doing Business‟ indicators is a significant determinant of investment in 
these countries. Specifically, a lower level of business regulation, less corruption and a stable political 
environment are important in reducing uncertainty and enhancing the level of investment. This 
confirms earlier empirical studies that the efficiency of social institutions is closely associated with 
political stability and leadership. It is therefore important that political reforms are undertaken in 
tandem with regulatory reforms in order to achieve significant economic outcomes. Reforms and 
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implementation of policy changes that affect the regulatory framework of a country must, however, be 
critically assessed. Even though the results suggest that the level of business regulation is important, 
they do not provide ample evidence to confirm what level of regulation a country must attain in order 
to attain a desired amount of investment. Further analysis is required to determine an appropriate level 
of regulation since intrinsically some regulation is required to ensure the effective control of the 
business environment. For policy purposes, not only the level of business regulation is important but 
also the types of regulation, such as the types of business regulation that need reform. For purposes of 
providing strong policy recommendations, further studies are required to consider country-specific 
characteristics in the assessment of the effect of business regulation on investment.. 
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CHAPTER 5: INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION AND GEOGRAPHY ON INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In recent years, policymakers and multi-lateral organisations have focused increasingly on the 
importance of a sound investment climate in developing countries. Stern (2002) refers to the 
investment climate as an environment that enhances both rural and urban productivity and investment. 
Therefore, the investment climate is important not only for large, formal-sector firms, it is also 
important for small and micro-sized enterprises, the informal sector and agricultural productivity. 
Given that the quantity and quality of investment in a country depend on the returns investors expect 
and the uncertainties around those returns, in order to create a favourable investment climate it is now 
accepted that a number of factors must exist. Indeed, macro-economic policy stability, political stability, 
well-functioning institutions and good governance are significant determinants. In addition, good 
infrastructure necessary for productive investment – including transportation, electricity and 
communication – is vital. 
 
The spatial location of a country has been considered a significant factor in influencing income 
differentials and economic development. Numerous studies show that there is a close relationship 
between the level of economic development of a country and its geographical features vis-á-vis 
locational factors such as natural resources, diseases and whether it is landlocked (Naudé, 2007; Limão 
& Venables, 2001). In the literature, the role of geography on economic performance has been viewed 
from three perspectives. First is that geography determines climate, endowment of natural resources, 
disease burden and transport costs. These factors have been considered to have an impact on policy 
and on the convergence of incomes across the world (Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999). Second is the 
integration perspective in which geography is essentially a platform for international trade and therefore 
influences firms‟ strategic location choices of global production (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004). Third is the institutional perspective in which it is asserted that 
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European colonialism led to the development of institutions of private property in previously poor 
areas that were usually sparsely populated, thereby encouraging investment, while introducing or 
maintaining extractive institutions in previously prosperous areas that were usually highly populated 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2002). Therefore, in explaining economic development, geography 
has been considered a factor that affects agricultural productivity and health directly, while indirectly 
impacting on the economy through distance and the quality of institutions (Naudé & Krugell, 2007). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether geography and the business regulatory 
environment influence investment in Africa. The geographical focus is on the spatial location of 
countries as a determinant of aggregate investment. It is well established that landlocked countries are 
geographically disadvantaged in competing globally, with trade involving greater distances and greater 
obstacles due to border crossings. In many landlocked economies in Africa, this is compounded by an 
unfavourable business environment. It is therefore argued that if these economies are to attract 
investment and encourage both domestic and foreign trade, improving the quality of their business 
regulatory environment is essential. Using the „Doing Business‟ dataset for business regulation, this 
analysis is able to evaluate the relative importance of business regulation and geography on the level of 
investment in 37African economies over a five-year period, from 2003 to 2007. This study contributes 
to the relatively small literature on the investment climate of African economies.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a discussion on the 
background literature. Section 5.3 contains a discussion on the methodology. Section 5.4 presents and 
discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5.5 summarises the findings of the research and 
draws conclusions.  
 
5.2. Literature review 
According to North (1990), the major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable structure for human interaction. This structure consists of both formal rules and 
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informal constraints embodied in the customs and traditions of society. Although the channel through 
which institutions influence economic performance is still challenged, it is accepted that effective and 
efficient institutions enhance economic prosperity. Excessive government regulation has often been 
considered an outcome of weak institutions since it often results in excessive bureaucratic red tape and 
corruption. Therefore, regulation may affect the ability of firms to engage in productive activity and 
thus influence the efficiency with which resources are used in the economy. In an empirical study of 
several sectors of 21 OECD18 countries, Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti & Schiantarelli (2005), regulation is 
seen as being a significant determinant of private investment. The authors provide sufficient evidence 
to show that product market regulation can influence the costs that existing firms face when expanding 
their productive capacity. Their overall assessment shows that regulatory reforms that substantially 
lower entry barriers spur investment. Furthermore, Dawson (2006) using cross-country data on 
regulation from the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW)19 from 1980 to 2000 and a sample 
of 127 countries, found that countries with less overall regulation have higher rates of private 
investment. By analysing the impact of different types of regulation – credit market, labour market and 
business – the study found that business regulation had a much higher impact than credit market 
regulation on private investment rates across countries. On the other hand, findings of the study 
showed that countries with more regulation had higher levels of government investment. Dawson 
(2006) therefore argues that a reduction in overall regulation appears to cause a substitution of private 
investment for government investment.   
 
It can be argued that the intrinsic motive for the existence of institutions is to ensure security of private 
property and contract enforcement. Many contemporary and economic historians assert that the role of 
the state in codifying and protecting property rights is important in providing the preconditions for 
investment, trade and economic growth. Weak property rights are considered a deterrent to investment 
since they increase the perceived risk and uncertainty to returns on investment and this has implications 
                                                 
18
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
19 Economic Freedom of the World Index includes regulation as one of its five major areas. Others include: (1) legal 
structure and security of property rights, (2) freedom to trade internationally, (3) access to sound money, and (4) size of 
government expenditures, taxes and enterprises (Fraser Institute‟s Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report). 
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for the growth of firms. It has been empirically shown that weak property rights limit the reinvestment 
of profits in some types of firms and that those firms with the least secure property rights invest nearly 
40 per cent less than those with more secure property rights (Pattillo, 2001). There is also evidence to 
show that strengthening property rights in Peruvian urban slums led to a significant increase in the rate 
of residential investment (Field, 2005). The empirical literature in cross-country studies also shows that 
less secure property rights correlatewith less aggregate investment and slower economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). However, Rodrik (2000) argues that formal 
property rights do not count much if they do not confer control rights. In other words, entrepreneurs 
will not have the initiative to innovate or invest unless they have adequate control over the return on 
their investment. This he asserts can be achieved if control rights are upheld by a combination of laws, 
public and private enforcement – regulators and courts – and customs and traditions. Djankov, 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2003) on the other hand contend that one cannot 
assume that property and contracts are secured by courts, especially in developing economies. Their 
study suggests that the legal system rather than the level of development of a country shapes the crucial 
dimensions of its judicial efficiency. They find that countries that have inherited legal systems (for 
instance from colonisers) with heavily formalised dispute resolution end up with lower-quality legal 
systems, at least for simple disputes. And although they assert that heavy procedural formalism has 
theoretically plausible reasons for its existence, they agree that it causes extreme costs and delays, 
unwillingness of potential participants to use courts and delayed justice. However, they suggest that a 
practical strategy of judicial reform at least with respect to simple disputes can be achieved by a 
reduction of procedural formalism.  
 
It has been asserted that tropical countries are nearly all poor and that landlocked countries tend to be 
much poorer than coastal economies (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1999). The extensive literature by 
Krugman (1991), Sachs (2001), Rodrik (2002) and others all show, using numerous geographical 
variables that geography to some extent matters for both economic growth and development. Ndulu & 
O‟Connell (2008) argue that geographical factors make investment and productivity growth more 
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expensive in Africa. Empirical evidence shows that economic geography influences the level of 
productivity within a country. Using a sample of 40 of India‟s largest industrial cities to investigate the 
impact of the business environment and economic geography on plant level productivity, Lall & 
Mengistae (2005), show that there are big productivity gaps across locations which to a large extent can 
be explained by differences in economic geography and business environment. They assert that a 
significant source of the effect of geography on plant productivity is from agglomeration, where firms 
gain efficiency due to proximity to others in the same line of business. Their results also show that a 
significant portion of productivity is also attributed to the effect of market access to the foreign and 
domestic trading partners of a location. This argument is supported by (Naude, 2007) who asserts that 
productivity is low in Africa because of insufficient proximity between economic agents within the 
continent, and between African countries and international markets. Furthermore, landlocked 
economies in Africa experience additional constraints in cross-continental trade because of numerous 
border crossings (Faye, McArthur, Sachs & Snow, 2004).  This has been found to have a significant 
cost-inducing effect through rising costs of transiting various borders, especially since overland 
transport costs are higher than shipping costs. This is exacerbated by time lost through delays at 
borders. This argument is supported by Gallup et al., (1999), who suggest that coastal economies could 
have military or economic incentives to impose costs on interior, landlocked economies. In addition, 
there is evidence to suggest that landlocked economies experience up to 50 per cent higher transport 
costs and about 60 per cent lower trade volumes than coastal economies (Naudé, 2007). This poor 
performance among landlocked economies is attributed to poor infrastructure, not only in the home 
country but also in neighbouring countries. Lack of adequate infrastructure and the complexity of 
infrastructure development across national borders make it difficult for firms to distribute resources 
and thus obtain economies of scale. According to Limão & Venables (2001), poor infrastructure 
accounts for  40 per cent of predicted costs for coastal economies and up to 60 per cent for landlocked 
countries. On the other hand, Naudé & Krugell (2007), in a study to investigate geography and 
institutions as determinants of FDI using a specification that includes a number of geographic 
variables, found that geography does not seem to have a direct influence on FDI flows to Africa. 
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5.3. Methodology  
This section describes the variables and data used in this study. The analysis covers a selection of 37 
coastal and landlocked economies in Africa over the period 2003 to 2007. The countries were selected 
because they had data on the variables considered in this study and the list of countries is shown in 
Table D.1 of the Appendix D. In addition, this section describes the empirical model strategy and 
analytical framework. 
 
5.3.1. Variables 
The dependent variable is the investment that is measured as gross capital stock as a percentage of GDP . 
Data was obtained from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2008. 
 
To measure business regulation, five sub-indicators from the „Doing Business‟ database are used 
(World Bank, 2008a). This is a database of business regulations that was created by the World Bank in 
2003. The indicators measure how regulation helps or hampers business performance in 181 countries 
and in 10 areas
20
 of everyday business activity. The data are based on the studies of laws and 
regulations obtained from surveys that are administered through local lawyers, government 
practitioners and accountants. The indicators are considered to provide more precise and objective 
measures of business regulation than any other available perception-based measures of institutions. 
Data was obtained from the „Doing Business‟ project online database. The sub-indicators selected for 
the analysis are divided into two broad categories. These are property rights (procedures to register 
property, enforce a contract and secure a building licence) and procedural requirements to trade across 
borders (documents to import or export).  
 
The number of procedures to register property: The number of procedures is recorded in absolute figures and 
records all procedures that are legally or in practice required to transfer property title from a seller to a 
buyer. There is evidence to suggest that property registration in the form of land titling significantly 
                                                 
20
 These are starting a business, dealing with licences, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. 
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increases land-attached investments. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negatively 
associated with investment since more procedures imply that securing property ownership rights is 
cumbersome.  
 
The number of procedures to enforce a contract: This variable is an indicator of the efficiency of the judicial 
system in a country. It measures the number of procedures required to enforce a commercial dispute. 
The „number of procedures‟ is considered to be a sufficient indicator, therefore the cost and time to 
execute these procedures is excluded in this study. As suggested in the literature, higher procedural 
formalism is a strong predictor of lengthy duration in dispute resolution. Higher formalism also 
predicts lower enforceability of contracts, higher corruption, as well as lower honesty, consistency and 
fairness of the system (Djankov et al., 2003). The number of procedures is recorded in absolute values 
and includes the steps required to file the case until judgment is enforced. Fewer procedures to enforce 
a contract imply that the courts are efficient and therefore it is simple to enforce a contract, while more 
procedures would imply the contrary.  
 
The number of procedures required in order to secure a building licence: The ease or difficulty of securing all the 
required building licences by a contractor is an indicator of the burden in securing property rights. 
Licensing registration measures the number of procedures required for a business in the construction 
industry to build a standardised warehouse. The procedures are measured in absolute values and more 
procedures imply that licensing regulation is rigid and cumbersome. The coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be negatively associated with investment. There is theoretical evidence to suggest that 
excessive licensing regulations, among other factors, have negatively influenced private investment in 
the electricity sector of Tanzania (Marandu, 2004).  
 
The number of documents to import/export: This variable measures the number of documents required to 
import or export from the time a full standard 20-foot, dry container load of goods is dispatched to the 
time the cargo is in the client‟s warehouse. These documents include bank documents, customs 
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declaration and clearance documents, port filing documents, import or export licences and other 
official documents exchanged between the concerned parties. It is assumed that the contract (sale 
agreement) has already been agreed upon and signed by both parties. These trade indicators describe 
the institutional features of a country‟s attitude towards the rest of the world with respect to trade. It is 
argued that such non-tariff trade barriers may not directly reflect the degree of effective protection 
faced by domestic agents, but only the legal framework they confront (Warcziarg, 2001). Similarly, 
more documents required imply that the import or export process is burdensome. There is a strong 
correlation between the number of documents and time required to meet all the requirements. The 
coefficients of these variables are expected to be negatively associated with investment.  
 
In order to measure geography, two variables are used. Landlocked dummy: A dummy variable is used for 
landlocked countries that take on the value of 0 if the country has a coastline and 1 otherwise. 
Henderson, Shalizi & Venables (2001) argue that being landlocked increases transport costs by more 
than 50 per cent.  Being landlocked not only increases transport costs but also increases in-transit 
administrative processes that cause long delays especially at border crossings (Faye et al., 2004). There 
are 13 landlocked countries in this study and they are all in sub-Saharan Africa. Another geographical 
variable used is the distance from the capital city to the port that handles most of the country‟s cargo. 
The capital city was selected because it is usually the largest economic hub in most African countries. 
Distance is also considered an indicator of transport costs, as one would expect transport costs to 
increase as one travels further inland. According to Naudé & Matthee (2007), distance remains the 
most important determinant of transport costs.  Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) show that easy 
access to coasts is important in lowering transport costs. The coefficient of this variable is therefore 
expected to be negatively associated with investment. The information was obtained from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact book (2009) and World Bank (2008b). 
 
Three control variables – trade openness, income and exchange rate – are included in this analysis. 
Trade openness can be measured by using trade as a percentage of GDP. It is the sum of imports and 
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exports measured as a percentage of GDP.  This variable is included as an indicator of both domestic 
and international market access. An increase in trade would imply a favourable investment 
environment; therefore, one can expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive. There is also 
evidence to show that trade openness is robustly and positively correlated with investment (Levine & 
Renelt, 1992). As a measure of macroeconomic stability, the real exchange rate is used. Intuitively, real 
depreciation of a country‟s currency raises the cost of imported capital goods. Since most investment 
goods in Africa are imported, depreciation will hamper private investment, especially in the non-
tradable goods sector. Conversely, depreciation of the real exchange rate would be expected to 
stimulate private investment by raising the profitability of the export goods sector (Ghura & Goodwin, 
2000). To measure the size of the economy, income measured as the log of GDP is used. Income is 
considered an important determinant for investment. Public investment is included since it is considered 
to be a significant determinant of private investment. Intuitively one would expect that public 
investment in social and physical infrastructure by raising the private and social rates of return could 
increase private investment. However, increases in public investment may also crowd out private 
investment if the additional government borrowing requirements raise domestic interest rates and 
future taxes. Therefore the anticipated effect of public investment is ambiguous. All these variables 
were obtained from the World Development indicators online database (World Bank, 2009). 
 
Two other regional dummies are included in this analysis – a landlocked dummy that excludes 
Botswana and a sub-Saharan African (SSA) dummy that excludes South Africa. Landlocked dummy excl. 
Botswana: It is argued that when Botswana is included in the landlocked dummy, the investment climate 
of landlocked economies in Africa is better than coastal economies (Doing Business, 2009). 
Furthermore Rodrik (2002) argues that Botswana is an example of a country that has performed well 
economically over an extended period and has adopted a heterodox mix of institutional arrangements – 
„orthodox elements with local heresies‟. This notion is therefore investigated with the data obtained. 
SSA dummy excl. South Africa: Similarly, South Africa is considered to have the most favourable 
investment climate. Understanding the results without South Africa in the sample may offer interesting 
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policy recommendations. The SSA dummy is included in each regression in order to account for time-
invariant region specific effects that may co-vary with investment.    
 
Endogenous bias may arise because countries with higher income may engage in more investment than 
others. It is argued in the literature that countries with rising or high incomes are more likely to have 
better regulatory environments. As countries grow faster, the cost of a heavy regulatory burden 
becomes higher as markets and business opportunities grow thereby accelerating regulatory reform. 
Government may face greater pressure from the private sector to remove administrative constraints. 
To instrument the regulation variables the legal origin is used. There is growing evidence to suggest that 
the legal tradition implanted in countries by European colonialists has profoundly shaped national 
approaches to the protection of property rights and the degree to which the state intervenes in the 
economy (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny,1998). Legal origin dummy: English legal origin 
equals 1 if the country has a English common law tradition and 0 if the country has a French civil law 
tradition as defined by the origin of each country‟s commercial/company law (La Porta et al., 1999). 
According to La Porta et al., (1998) and Beck et al., (2003), French civil law was developed to unify the 
legal system, prevent jurisprudence, and solidify state control of the courts. By contrast, English 
common law evolved to protect property owners from state control. Beck et al., (2003) show that 
countries with French legal origins tend to have lower levels of property rights protection than 
countries with English origins after controlling for many other factors, including natural resource 
endowments. The legal origin was obtained from Botero et al., (2004) and the CIA World Fact book.  
 
5.3.2. Empirical model strategy 
This section discusses the theoretical framework and empirical model that will measure the effect of 
geography and the business regulation on the investment climate. This is done by formulating the main 
hypotheses which include: firstly; economies with better property rights invest more; secondly, the 
spatial location of a country influences investment and thirdly, fewer trade regulation barriers enhance 
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investment. In terms of geography this study focuses on the spatial location of countries and how it 
influences investment. 
For many decades, the effect of regulation on economic performance has been debated by economists. 
There are a number of theories of regulation in the literature that have been postulated to explain this 
relationship. These include the public interest theory, contracting theory and the enforcement theory of 
regulation. The public interest theory of regulation associated with Pigou (1938) assumes that firstly, 
unhindered markets often fail because of problems of monopoly or externalities and secondly, that 
governments are benevolent and capable of correcting these market failures through regulation. In 
other words, regulation seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large. There were a number of 
criticisms of these assumptions. Coase (1960) criticised the first assumption in his original work on 
contracting theory by affirming that in cases where competition and private ordering do not 
successfully address market failures, impartial courts can do so by enforcing contracts and common law 
rules for torts. Therefore, Coase argued that as long as courts enforced these contracts, equilibrium 
outcomes would be efficient. Later, these assumptions became the subject of criticism by economists 
like Stigler, (1971) and Posner (1974). A detailed discussion on theories of regulation is beyond the 
scope of this document
21
. The focus of this study, however, is based on a more recent theory – the 
enforcement theory of regulation by Djankov, Glasear, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003). They 
argue that if society wishes to control business in order to pursue socially desirable goals, there are four 
distinct strategies for such control that are not mutually exclusive. These strategies include market 
discipline, private litigation, public enforcement through regulation, and state ownership. Djankov et al., 
(2003), provides a case in point that competition and regulation often operate in the same market, as do 
private litigation and public regulation. The basic premise of the enforcement theory of regulation is 
that all these strategies are imperfect, and that optimal institutional design involves a choice among 
these alternatives. The enforcement theory of regulation also recognises a trade-off between two social 
costs, dictatorship
22
 and disorder
23
. They assert that these two social costs exist in all four strategies 
                                                 
21 See Shleifer (2005) for a detailed discussion. 
22
 Dictatorship refers to the ability of the government and its officials to impose such costs on private agents. 
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albeit in different proportions. The challenge is identifying the equilibrium point that provides most 
benefits and least cost. Underlying all these theories is a consensus that regulation imposes costs on 
economic agents arising out of immeasurable transactions.  
 
Evidence in the literature shows that secure property rights enhance economic prosperity. In particular, 
better protection of property rights increases aggregate investment and fosters economic growth 
(Johnson et al., 2002). It is largely accepted that the channel through which property rights affects 
investment occurs through a security-induced investment demand effect and a collateral-based credit 
supply effect. Therefore, secure property rights enhance investment because the perceived risk of losing 
ownership rights is reduced. Similarly, lenders are more willing to extend credit firstly when they are 
assured that assets pledged as collateral are secure and free of competing claims and, secondly, when 
they are confident of the enforceability of contracts in a country‟s courts. 
 
There are a number of channels through which trade can influence investment.  First, according to 
Wacziarg (2001), investment may respond to openness through the size of the market effect. He argues 
that market size imposes a constraint on the division of labour so that more open countries are better 
able to exploit increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, Wacziarg (1997) shows that trade liberalisation 
may simply remove structural constraints by allowing domestic agents to import capital goods that were 
previously unavailable (or produced locally but at a higher cost). In both cases, trade liberalisation will 
influence investment through the marginal factor productivity of firms.  
 
Geography is considered an exogenous determinant that influences the economy both directly (for 
instance in agricultural productivity) and indirectly through its effect on market integration or the 
quality of institutions (Rodrik et al., 2003). The spatial relationship between countries affects not only 
goods trade, but also other forms of interaction like the mobility of physical and human capital. It is 
argued that geographical factors affect proximity and productivity through higher transport costs. This 
                                                                                                                                                                  
23
 Disorder refers to the ability of private agents to harm others – to steal, overcharge, injure, cheat and impose external 
costs. 
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is through distance between centres of economic activity within countries or to and from global 
markets. Therefore, distance influences the cost of doing business, by increasing both transport and 
transaction costs, which affects the productivity of firms adversely. For instance there is evidence to 
show that due to costly transport, small firms are forced to hold large inventories that contribute to 
high fixed costs and lower productive efficiency (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Furthermore, being 
landlocked has a cost-inducing effect on economic activity through the rising cost of transiting various 
borders as well as time lost by border delays (Naude, 2007). Both channels affect the productive 
capacity and competitiveness that influences firms‟ ability to invest and grow. 
 
Based on the theories explaining the role of institutions and geography on economic activity discussed 
above, this study represents an attempt to estimate the following equation: 
 
                                                                  ...(5.1) 
 
where  is the gross capital stock of country i in year t,   is a selection of business regulation 
variables,   is a selection of geography variables,  is a selection of control variables and  is 
the composite error term. The coefficients of interest are and and throughout the analysis, the 
size, sign and significance of the coefficients will be closely compared. 
 
5.3.3.  Analytical framework 
 
The analysis is carried out within a panel data framework. Panel data involves the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods (Baltagi, 2008). This compensates for 
the lack of time-series depth by increasing the degrees of freedom and therefore provides more 
efficient estimates. The basic framework for the analysis is in the form of the following regression 
equation: 
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 =                                                                            ...(5.2) 
      
where i = 1...37; t = 1...5),  with  =     or    
 
In this case  is a random term and  is the country specific effect and  is a random effect. 
Different assumptions about  (or ) lead to either using the fixed effects approach or the random 
effects approach when estimating the different coefficients. In order to determine whether the fixed or 
random effects estimation technique is appropriate for the analysis, the Hausman (1978) specification 
test will be used. In addition the presence of serial-correlation and heteroskedaticity across the panels 
will be investigated. 
 
5.4. Empirical results  
5.4.1. Descriptive summary statistics 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the descriptive statistics for the full sample and for coastal and landlocked 
economies respectively. It requires an average of 10 complete documents to import goods into an 
African country (See Table 5.1). This result is similar for both coastal and landlocked economies in 
Africa. Similarly, it requires an average of eight complete documents to export goods from a country in 
Africa and this result is similar for both coastal and landlocked economies. However, it costs on 
average 200 per cent more to import goods in landlocked economies in Africa as compared to coastal 
economies. In addition, it costs on average 180 per cent more to export goods from landlocked 
economies as compared to coastal economies. Capital cities of landlocked economies are on average 
992.70 kilometres away from the nearest coastline as compared to coastal economies that are an 
average of 176 kilometres away. The three property rights indicators show no significant difference 
among coastal and landlocked economies.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics (full sample – 37 countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics (Landlocked and Coastal economies) 
 
Variable Landlocked Economies (13) Coastal Economies (24) 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Property registration                             6.46 2.67 4 13 7.22 2.91 4 19 
Contract enforcement                           38.07 5.56 24 48 40.46 5.03 30 50 
Licensing procedures                            18.34 5.78 9 32 19.55 7.91 10 49 
Import documentation                          11.10 3.61 7 20 9.41 2.03 6 14 
Import costs                                        3238.75 1061.68 1210 5520 1488 673.28 600 3733 
Export documentation                          8.69 2.32 6 14 8.26 2.05 4 12 
Export costs                                        2491.40 1170.45 1050 4867 1261.19 661.70 463 3733 
Income         447 356 59.5 1170 3064 5250 105 27300 
Exchange rate                                       88.59 20.67 49.3 134.5 94.33 49.84 0.3 330.3 
Trade                                       63.21 32.47 31 162 78.84 26.42 39 142 
Distance 992.70 375.26 353 1627.87 159.57 222.58 1 718.49 
Aggregate investment                  20.96 9.16 5.8 45.5 21.05 7.08 8.1 46.38 
Private investment                 15.14 7.09 2.3 43.4 14.02 5.38 1.9 27.7 
Public investment                  6.41 6.02 -14.9 16.7 7.25 6.35 1.1 50.6 
 
5.4.2. Empirical results 
The empirical results in Tables 5.3 show the effect of business regulation and geography on investment 
in an unbalanced panel of 37 countries over the period 2003 to 2007. Prais-Winsten regression 
estimates were generated for the model specified in equation (5.1). The results presented are for three 
dependent variables: aggregate investment measured as the gross capital stock as a percentage of GDP, 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Property registration                             6.95 2.84 4 19 
Contract enforcement                           39.6 5.33 24 50 
Licensing procedures                            19.23 7.23 9 49 
Import documentation                          10 2.79 6 20 
Import costs                                        2103.13 1177.84 600 5520 
Export documentation                          8.41 2.15 4 14 
Export costs                                        1693.43 1051.41 463 4867 
Income         2140 4410 595 27300 
Exchange rate                                       92.32 41.98 0.3 330.3 
Trade                                       73.35 29.57 31 162 
Distance 452.29 489.97 1 1627.87 
Aggregate investment                  21.02 7.85 5.8 46.38 
Private investment                 14.14 6.05 1.9 43.4 
Public investment                  6.96 6.24 -14.9 50.6 
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private capital formation also measured as a percentage of GDP, and public capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP. Aggregate investment was split into private and public investment since there is 
evidence to show that splitting total investment into these two components has a significant impact on 
the results. In their study of institutions and their impact on investment and growth, Gwartney, 
Holcombe & Lawson (2006) found private investment rates were much more responsive to cross-
country differences than rates of government investment. Since the two trade regulation variables are 
indicators of the same institution, and their effect on the economy is highly correlated, the results are 
presented in two separate columns. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the results with import regulation 
and columns (2), (4) and (6) report the results for export regulation.  
 
The results in columns (1) and (2) for aggregate investment show that most explanatory variables are 
significant, although not with the predicted signs. Two of the property rights variables were found to 
have a significant effect on investment. Licensing regulation has a significant and negative effect on 
investment. This result implies that the longer it takes to secure the required licences and permits the 
longer it takes to obtain full ownership and control of property. This result is consistent with the 
literature that shows that excessive licensing regulations have a negative effect on investment (Marandu, 
2004).  
 
Furthermore, property registration is a significant and negative determinant of investment. In essence 
this result implies that more cumbersome administrative procedures to secure formal ownership of 
property decreases investment. This result is consistent with a priori expectation since there is evidence 
to suggest that a less bureaucratic property registration process increases access to credit and 
investment (Burns, 2005). The coefficient for contract enforcement is insignificant in column (1) and 
significant although at a 10 per cent level in column (2). The initial result (column 1) is inconsistent 
with results from previous studies that confirm that higher procedural formalism is associated with 
lengthy durations in dispute resolution, lower enforceability of contracts and higher corruption 
(Djankov et al,. 2003). 
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Table 5.3: Regression Results  
 
 Aggregate 
investment 
Private 
investment 
 Public 
investment 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property rights 
Property registration 
 
-0.0078** 
(-4.52) 
 
-0.0084** 
(-3.86) 
 
-0.0030** 
(-2.07) 
 
-0.0029** 
(-2.04) 
 
-0.0057*  
(-2.83) 
 
-0.0056* 
(3.00) 
Contract enforcement -0.0013 
(-1.36) 
-0.0018* 
(-1.74) 
-0.0016* 
(-2.40) 
-0.0016* 
(-2.26) 
0.0010 
(0.69) 
0.0007 
(0.63) 
Licensing regulation -0.0037*** 
(-5.67) 
-0.0034*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.0029*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.0026*** 
(-6.30) 
-0.0004 
(-0.52) 
0.0002 
(0.26) 
Trade regulation 
Import regulation 
 
-0.037** 
(-2.27) 
  
-0.0014* 
(-1.71) 
  
-0.0038** 
(-2.35) 
 
Export regulation  -0.0064* 
(-2.55) 
 -0.0011 
(-0.71) 
 -0.0073 
(-2.94) 
Geography 
Landlocked (dummy) 
 
0.1593*** 
(3.97) 
 
0.1522*** 
(3.74) 
 
0.1333*** 
(4.20) 
 
0.1329*** 
(4.17) 
 
0.0305* 
(2.02) 
 
0.0165 
(1.02) 
Distance (from port) -0.0359* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0473*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.05323*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.0569*** 
(-4.14) 
0.0320 
(1.62) 
0.0216 
(1.25) 
Landlocked (excl. Botswana) -0.1544** 
(-3.80) 
-0.1384** 
(-3.42) 
-0.0883*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0846*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.0609* 
(-3.11) 
-0.0395 
(-2.17) 
       
Public investment (1st lag)   -0.1410*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.1419*** 
(-3.64) 
  
Income -0.0267*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.0242*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.0115* 
(-2.09) 
-0.0106* 
(-1.98) 
-0.0148** 
(-2.87) 
-0.0100** 
 (-2.12) 
Exchange rate -0.0003*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.0002** 
(-3.26) 
-0.0002** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0001 
(-1.22) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.84) 
Trade 0.0557*** 
(2.70) 
0.0547** 
(3.03) 
-0.0055 
(-0.49) 
-0.0040 
(-0.37) 
0.0758*** 
(3.24) 
0.0781*** 
(3.38) 
Legal origin (English) 0.0281** 
(2.53) 
0.0220** 
(2.10) 
0.0287*** 
(3.49) 
0.0278*** 
(3.40) 
-0.0127 
(-1.13) 
-0.0201 
(-2.13) 
SSA dummy (excl. South Africa) -0.1189*** 
(-6.01) 
-0.1093*** 
(-5.40) 
-0.0964*** 
(-5.18) 
-0.0948*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.015 
(-1.01) 
0.0086 
(0.55) 
Constant 0.4631*** 
(7.71) 
0.4830*** 
(6.88) 
0.3906*** 
(9.38) 
0.3827*** 
(9.06) 
0.034 
(0.40) 
0.0295 
(0.41) 
R-Squared 0.7816 0.7760 0.8379 0.8421 0.3753 0.4282 
Wald chi 2 (12)345.44 
[0.0000] 
(12)265.48 
[0.0000] 
(13)172.44 
[0.0000] 
(13)191.97 
[0.0000] 
(12)95.77 
[0.0000] 
(12)139.79 
[0.0000] 
No. of observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. t-statistic are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. 
 *** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10% 
 
However, even though the latter is consistent with a priori expectation, it is weakly significant. Possibly 
it suggests that there are other factors that influence contract enforcement that are not captured by this 
variable. It is argued that even if property rights are properly defined and protected, market transactions 
leave much room for cheating (Fafchamps, 1996).  He argues that in reality there are many contractual 
dimensions that are equally, if not more important to parties, such as trust (that justice will be obtained 
in courts), that increase contractual risk. Given the presence of information asymmetries in any 
economy, Fafchamps (2004) argues that it generates contract enforcement problems because it makes 
contractual obligations difficult to verify by agents not party to the contract, including courts. He 
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provides evidence to suggest that because contract enforcement through courts and police is imperfect 
in Africa, economic agents depend on costless legal enforcement that is based on social networks and 
mutual trust, which happen outside the realm of any formal legal system. Lastly, evidence from African 
manufacturing firms show that large firms are more likely to encounter contract non-compliance and to 
make use of lawyers and courts compared to smaller firms that operate in the unsophisticated 
manufacturing sector (Fafchamps, 2004).  
 
The estimated coefficient for import regulation is negative and significant at a 5 per cent level. Given 
that this indicator measures the efficiency of trading institutions, this result implies that excessive and 
burdensome administrative hurdles in filing the required import documentation have a significant 
negative effect on investment. Intuitively, since most imports in Africa are considered to be for 
manufacturers, one would expect that higher import barriers would increase the cost of doing business, 
which would reduce profitability and therefore have a negative effect on investment. According to 
Morrissey & Jones (2005), the most immediate effect of reducing non-tariff barriers is to make it easier 
to import, which would reduce the domestic price for imports. However the impact is indeterminate 
given that there are a number of factors like transport costs that also influence the cost of goods. The 
results in column (1) also show that excessive export regulation has a negative effect on investment. 
This result is consistent with previous empirical studies (Feder, 1982). It is argued that reducing 
administrative barriers to export also reduces the time to distribute goods, which improves the 
efficiency and competitiveness of exporting firms. As a result, exporting firms are able to grow faster 
due to the acquisition of international knowledge, product design techniques and technology diffusion 
(Bernard & Wagner, 1997).  The relative magnitude of the coefficient for imports is significantly higher 
than that for exports, which is consistent with previous empirical studies. According to Baldwin and 
Seghezza (1996), the effect of foreign barriers on investment is less strong and robust than that of 
domestic protection. 
The distance from the capital city to the largest port was found to be significant and negative at a 1 per 
cent level of significance. This result shows that a one standard-deviation decrease in distance increases 
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investment by an average of 2 per cent. Since the distance from the ocean has been found to influence 
investment through transport costs, this result confirms previous studies on landlocked economies 
(Naudé & Matthee, 2007). The landlocked dummy was found to be significant and positive, implying 
that landlocked economies had higher investment than coastal economies. Although this result may 
appear unrealistic since coastal economies have higher incomes and trade more (See Table 5.3), 
evidence from previous studies confirms this result. Collectively, landlocked economies in Africa have 
been found to have a business regulatory environment, as measured by the „Doing Business‟ indicators, 
which is more conducive to private sector investment in comparison to the coastal economies because 
of the inclusion of Botswana in the analysis. When Botswana was removed, the coefficient for the 
landlocked dummy had the expected sign. Landlocked economies excluding Botswana experience less 
investment. Botswana, according to the „Doing Business‟ reports, has been ranked consistently among 
the top four economies with the most favourable business regulatory environment in Africa. And 
among the landlocked economies, Botswana was found to have the most favourable business 
environment in the five-year sample period of this study (World Bank, 2008). The outstanding 
performance of the country has been attributed to, among other factors, its political system (non-
corrupt, multi-party democracy), the quality of its political leadership, its sound economic policies and 
institutions as well as good infrastructure that have fostered private sector growth.  The strength of its 
political and economic institutions has been attributed to its pre-colonial institutional heritage in which 
the political and economic centres of power were independent. This tradition was found to be strongly 
embedded in its post-colonial institutions and is still evident in its present institutional framework and 
government policies (Rodrik, 2002).  
 
The sub-Saharan Africa dummy that excludes South Africa was also found to be significant at a 1 per 
cent level of significance and negatively associated with investment. This result confirms previous 
studies on investment and growth in Africa. Two of the control variables- trade openness and exchange 
rates- were found to be highly significant and with the predicted signs. However, income growth was 
found to have a negative association with investment at a 1 per cent level, implying that higher income 
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growth reduces investment. This result is not surprising given that there is ample evidence to show that 
income levels in Africa are generally low and as such do not stimulate savings and investments in both 
the public and private sectors. A greater fraction of income is spent on government and private 
consumption expenditure rather than savings and investment. Furthermore, it has been found that an 
increase in income results in greater demand for imports (of both competitive and non-competitive 
imports) without any significant rise in domestic demand for locally produced goods. This tends to 
discourage private sector investment (Ndulu & O‟Connell, 2008). The estimated coefficient for the 
legal origin was found to be positive and significant at a 5 per cent level, implying that countries with an 
English common law tradition have higher investment than those with a French civil law tradition. 
These results are consistent with the findings from previous studies even after controlling for business 
regulation and geography (Beck et al,. 2003). English common law countries have been found to have 
higher investment since property rights are much better protected than in French civil law countries.  
 
The effect of business regulation and geography on private investment is shown in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 5.4. Public investment is included because it has been found to be a significant determinant of 
private investment. The coefficients of the three property rights indicators behave similarly to the 
results obtained in both columns (1) and (2). The results show that property rights are a significant 
determinant of private investment. The coefficient for import regulation is significant at a 1 per cent 
level and negatively associated with private investment. This result is consistent with the theory and 
shows that a one standard deviation decrease in import regulation increases private investment by 0.39 
per cent. On the other hand, export regulation was found to be an insignificant determinant of private 
investment. This result is plausible since there is evidence to suggest that most successful export firms 
in developing countries are fewer and larger than most other types of firms (Levy, 1999). Possibly 
according to Dollar et al. (2006), administrative barriers and delays may not pose a challenge to 
exporting firms because of what they call the „lobbying effect‟. These firms can provide political 
pressure to reform these particular areas or institutions. The coefficient for the landlocked dummy is 
positive, implying that landlocked economies have higher private investment than coastal economies. 
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However, when Botswana was removed from the sample, landlocked economies had less private 
investment than coastal economies. These economies have approximately 8 per cent less investment 
than coastal economies. This result confirms both the theory and empirical literature that being 
landlocked has a negative effect on private investment (Faye et al., 2004).  The distance to the coast was 
also found to be significant at a 1 per cent level and to have a negative effect on private investment. 
The magnitude of both geographical variables – being landlocked and distance from ports – supports 
the argument that geography plays a significant role in Africa‟s investment environment (Sachs, 2005). 
Macroeconomic stability measured by the exchange rate was found to be a significant determinant of 
private investment. On the other hand, the trade openness coefficients in both columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 5.4 were found to be insignificant and negatively associated with investment. This result 
contradicts previous studies (like Baldwin & Seghezza, 1996; Wacziarg, 2001). However, Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008) provide evidence to suggest that this result is plausible if countries adopt contractionary 
macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of trade reforms or undertake protectionist measures to shield 
domestic sectors to counteract the effect of trade reforms. The coefficient for public investment was 
found to be highly significant. This result shows that during this sample period, public investment had 
significant negative effects on private investment, indicating a „crowding-out‟ effect. This result is 
consistent with results from studies that show additional government borrowing requirements in Africa 
sometimes have the effect of raising domestic interest rates and taxes, which reduces private sector 
investment (Ghura & Goodwin, 2000). The legal origin was found to be a significant determinant of 
private investment with the estimated coefficient showing that countries with an English common law 
tradition have almost up to 3 per cent higher private investment than those with a French civil law 
tradition.  
 
It is not surprising that public investment in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.3 was found to be less 
responsive to both business regulation and geographical variables. Among the property rights variables, 
only property registration had a significant effect on public investment. Excessive import and export 
regulation have a negative effect on public investment in this sample. Although distance was found to 
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have an insignificant effect on public investment, the estimated coefficient for being landlocked was 
significant. The coefficient for the landlocked dummy excluding Botswana was significant. Trade 
openness was found to encourage public investment while an increase in income growth was found to 
reduce public investment. The legal origin dummy was found to be insignificant for public investment, 
implying that there was no significant difference among English common law and French civil law 
economies. This result is plausible since governments have the function to invest in social and physical 
infrastructure to meet society‟s social needs irrespective of legal tradition. 
 
 5.5.  Conclusion 
The objective of this analysis was to investigate the effect of the business regulatory environment and 
geography on investment. Using an unbalanced panel data set of business regulation and geographical 
variables for 37 countries over a five-year period (2003-2007), the results show that property ownership 
rights, trade regulations, being landlocked and distance from ports affects the level of investment in 
African countries. The estimates generated confirm that business regulation, as measured by the „Doing 
Business‟ indicators, is a significant determinant of investment. Specifically, more secure property rights 
improve the investment climate of countries. Furthermore, fewer administrative barriers to import and 
export have a significant effect on the level of investment. The geographical variables confirm the 
findings of earlier empirical studies that being landlocked and the distance to ports have a negative 
effect on the level of investment in a country. Evidently, among the business regulation variables the 
findings show property rights protection in landlocked economies is not significantly different from 
that in coastal economies. Therefore, landlocked economies can improve their investment climate to 
overcome their geographical disadvantages by improving the security of property rights and 
enforcement. In addition, landlocked countries can focus on industries that require less mobility of 
resource inputs, for instance serve as high-tech hubs for the tourism trade and information technology. 
However, this must be done in tandem with addressing human capital constraints since highly skilled 
labour is much more likely to emigrate than to attract physical capital into the country. Improving 
physical infrastructure by encouraging investment in infrastructure will reduce transport costs 
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significantly and encourage intra-regional trade. In addition, a greater commitment from African leaders 
to encourage inter-regional trade and provide incentives for innovation will foster the development of a 
favourable investment climate in this region. These results are limited in scope since it was assumed 
that the investment climate is the same across a country, which seldom is the case. Therefore, country-
specific studies may reveal important interactions between geography and institutions that this cross-
country empirical study does not. Further research opportunities in this area with data over a longer 
period and fewer countries may provide more substantive results since institutions historically take a 
long time to manifest significant changes on economic performance.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the findings from the results obtained in the various chapters are summarised. The 
conclusions are based on the findings obtained and recommendations are aligned to the objectives of 
this research. This chapter also provides suggestions for future research arising from this study. 
 
6.2 Summary 
This dissertation consists of a collection of four stand-alone essays investigating the effect of a number 
of investment climate determinants on investment in a selection of economies in Asia, Latin America, 
Europe and Africa. Chapter Two of this dissertation examined the effect of the business regulatory 
environment on the level of investment using a selection of emerging economies around the world. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five investigated the effect of business regulation and other determinants of 
the investment climate on the level of investment in African countries. 
 
Chapter Two investigated empirically the effect of the business regulatory environment as measured by 
the „Doing Business‟ indicators on the level of investment in a selection of 29 emerging economies in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. The results showed that the investment in these emerging 
economies is enhanced by more secure property rights and by low levels of business entry regulation. 
In particular the results showed that fewer administrative procedures required to formalise a business 
have a positive and significant effect on the level of investment. In addition, fewer administrative 
hurdles to register property or to secure business licences have a positive and significant effect on the 
level of investment. Furthermore, the estimates generated showed that flexible employment regulations 
are not significant determinants of investment. This result confirms previous studies that show that the 
effect of flexible labour regulations on economic performance may only be felt when other labour 
market institutions are not well established and enforced. In contrast, investor protection that was 
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measured by two indicators, the protection of minority shareholders rights, and lender and borrower 
rights were found to be insignificant determinants of investment. The results also showed that the Latin 
American countries had significantly lower levels of investment compared to emerging European 
economies. Finally, countries that adopted French legal traditions had a significantly lower investment 
compared to those that adopted English legal traditions. These results support previous studies that 
show that countries with French legal traditions offer less protection of investors‟ and property rights 
compared to those of English legal traditions. On the whole, business regulation as measured by the 
„Doing Business‟ indicators influences the level of investment though the reliability of these indicators 
was tested further in the next three chapters. 
 
Chapter Three examined the effect of business regulation on the stock market liquidity using a sample 
of fifteen stock markets in Africa. The results from the panel data analysis showed that the overall level 
of business regulation does not influence stock market activity. However, the results confirmed those 
obtained in previous studies that greater protection of minority share holders‟ rights, and lender and 
borrowers‟ rights enhances stock market activity. There was anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
improved judicial efficiency influences stock market liquidity. The legal origin was found to have a 
significant effect on the legal systems of the selected countries. Countries that adopted French legal 
traditions had significantly less active stock markets than countries that adopted English legal traditions. 
Countries with French legal origin were found to have narrower stock markets and less investor and 
property rights protection. These results confirm that better property rights and investor protection are 
significant determinants in influencing stock market activity and therefore the level of investment in a 
country.  
 
Chapter Four investigated the effect of the level of business regulation, infrastructure and political 
environment on the level investment in 29 African countries. The results provide evidence to show that 
lower levels of business regulation, less corruption in government and a stable political environment are 
significant determinants of investment. In particular, the results suggest that military regimes create a 
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less favourable investment climate although they appear to spend more on social and economic 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that civilian regimes in Africa are more corrupt 
than military regimes. Infrastructure development was found to be significant but negatively associated 
with investment. Similarly, in this sample, countries that adopted English legal traditions have a 
significantly better investment climate resulting in higher investment levels compared to those that 
adopted French legal traditions. 
 
Chapter Five examined the effect of business regulatory environment and geography on the level of 
investment in 37 African countries. The results showed that a property right, trade regulations, being 
landlocked and distant from the sea affects the level of investment in the selected countries. 
Specifically, less administrative obstacles to register property, enforce a contract, secure a building 
licence as well as import and export have a significant and positive effect on investment. In contrast, 
being landlocked and distant from ports increases the exposure to administrative delays at various 
border crossings and increases transport costs, which has a negative effect on investment. The results 
also showed that property rights protection in landlocked economies was not significantly different 
from that of coastal economies. Furthermore, countries that adopted English legal traditions have a 
significantly higher levels of investment compared to those that adopted French legal traditions. This 
result was consistent in all the studies of this dissertation. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of the entire research, the following recommendations are made in order to guide 
policy and regulatory reforms that would enhance the investment climate of countries.  
 
Governments should continue to pursue reforms to protect property rights. This can be done by 
establishing and enforcing clear and simple laws that protect property rights. For instance, governments 
could establish transparent and efficient property registration processes like the computerisation of the 
property registration process to reduce corruption and enhance efficiency.  
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 It is essential that the judiciary is able to operate efficiently in resolving commercial disputes. Therefore 
judicial reforms to enhance efficiency could encompass, for instance, an evaluation of current business 
legislation to assess their effect on businesses. Reforms can then be implemented based on the 
outcomes of the evaluation and focus specifically on the current needs of businesses. Furthermore, 
governments could enhance the authority of alternative avenues for dispute resolution like commercial 
arbitration or mediation systems so that their outcomes are legally binding. This way the backlog in 
many magistrate and high courts of developing economies would be significantly reduced. In addition 
to reforms in the judiciary to enhance its resources and manpower capacity, governments could 
establish a mechanism to monitor the performance of magistrates and judges in order to improve 
service delivery. 
 
Reforms to enhance and enforce collateral and bankruptcy laws should continue in order to protect the 
rights of borrowers, lenders and minority shareholders. This can be done by establishing collateral and 
credit registries so that companies can take advantage of the laws and get access to credit. For those 
countries with well-functioning paper based  
collateral registries and credit information systems, computerisation of the process or combining 
collateral and credit information systems would enhance efficiency of these registries. 
 
Governments should find new ways of attracting investment in infrastructure by putting place the 
necessary legislation, policies and frameworks. For instance, ensuring that the necessary policies and 
legislations are in place to encourage public-private partnerships. Furthermore, governments could 
offer incentives to investors who invest in major infrastructure development or, alternatively, facilitate 
bi-lateral partnerships between governments especially for cross-border roads and railway networks.  
 
Furthermore, harmonisation of non-tariff trade regulations (import and export regulations) among 
trading partners would greatly support the initiatives that most African countries are taking in enhance 
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intra-regional trade. For instance one standard set of import or export documents applicable to the 
East African region and administered in the source country, may reduce numerous administrative 
delays at border crossings.  
 
All the above recommendations are based on the commitment of African leaders to champion these 
reforms in their countries. The greatest challenge among African governments is that the leaders and 
their cronies are involved in corruption, a systemic factor than hampers investment by increasing the 
cost of doing business. It is therefore prudent to suggest that Africa needs a new brand of leadership 
that is passionate and determined to see change in the wellbeing of its people. However, be that as it 
may, there are interventions that governments could enforce to reduce corruption. For instance, 
governments could create autonomous bodies that have the capacity to enforce anti-corruption 
strategies focused on investigation, prevention and education of the public.  
 
Governments can also adopt active and inclusive interventions for the private sector by for instance 
creating efficient export and investment promotion agencies or encouraging the creation of business 
associations. Businesses can help to broaden the dialogue on investment climate policy between 
government and business by acting as lobbyist to advance their interests. They can also provide 
feedback on the effect of government policies and regulations on the business environment, which is 
relevant for policy reforms.  
 
6.4 Directions for future research 
The most significant limitation arising out of this study is that of data availability on various business 
regulations. Future studies could focus on a wider selection of business regulations in order to obtain a 
better understanding of the influence of the regulatory environment, a determinant of the investment 
climate, on the level of investment in countries. In addition, a longer time-series analysis may show 
more significant trends in regulation to guide reform since institutions historically evolve slowly.  
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Other studies could focus on the institutional and regulatory factors that influence specific sectors of 
the economy like the agricultural or tourism sectors of a country or specific group of countries. Most 
African economies still rely heavily on subsistence agricultural production as a source of food for the 
majority of their people. Understanding the regulatory barriers to investment in this sector may guide 
policy makers in making better policies and regulations to encourage investment in form of mechanised 
agricultural production.  
 
Finally, similar studies could be carried out at country level to investigate whether there are any unique 
country characteristics of the investment climate that may influence investment. These studies would 
provide country specific results that would guide policy markers better policies and regulations to 
enhance investment. 
 
6.5. Limitations of the findings 
In spite of the acknowledged limitations of this research, conclusions based on the findings are not 
compromised and the four studies contribute to a better understanding of the investment climate in the 
selected economies. Therefore, the results may not be wholly representative of all the countries on the 
African continent, but they provide a snapshot on the kind of challenges that some African economies 
face. It is anticipated that this will stimulate further debate and research in this area. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Africa and Latin America  
 
 
Variable 
Africa – 10 Countries Latin America – 6 countries 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Business entry regulation 10.1 2.533 6 14 12.03 3.38 8 19 
Licensing regulation 19.67 4.581 10 28 18.5 5.31 12 28 
Employment regulation 33.5 16.21 7 63 37.47 9.74 24 48 
Property registration 7.68 4.135 4 19 7.33 3.37 5 14 
Borrower and lender rights  5.725 2.611 3 10 4.17 1.09 3 7 
Investor protection  5.33 1.58 3 8 5.65 0.80 3.7 6.7 
Contract enforcement 38.5 5.40 29 47 38.6 3.87 34 46 
Income  520.77 512.37 50 1769.14 3259.81 2780.73 583.47 8070.80 
Savings 24.28 14.52 3 54 24.07 5.17 17 37 
Inflation 8.46 5.96 0 29 7.16 3.27 3 14 
Labour force participation 
rate 
63.36 9.16 49 83 68.97 6.29 58 78 
Gross capital formation 25.1 6.29 16 42 20.27 2.59 15 25 
 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Europe and Asia 
 
 
Variable 
Emerging Europe – 5 Countries Asia – 8 Countries 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Business entry regulation 8.52 2.48 5 13 10.73 2.52 5 15 
Licensing regulation 29.6 14.07 17 56 21.21 7.62 11 37 
Employment regulation 42.96 12.08 29 66 27.93 10.10 10 44 
Property registration 6.9 1.16 6 9 5.75 1.95 2 8 
Borrower and lender 
rights 
6.0 2.17 3 8 4.94 2.50 3 10 
Investor protection  5.62 0.42 5 6 5.72 1.32 4 8.7 
Contract enforcement 36.76 2.69 32 40 37.13 4.45 30 46 
Income 1905.14 1436.75 143.91 4061.77 4771.20 6115.71 177.09 23644.36 
Savings 18.64 7.93 10 34 30.13 11.28 10 54 
Inflation 10.16 6.80 0 24 5.6 3.82 0 15 
Labour force participation 
rate 
62.04 5.95 51 73 69.3 7.56 59 84 
Gross capital formation 22.48 3.96 18 35 27.88 8.12 14 46 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics French Legal origin 
 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
 
Business entry regulation 9.65 2.53 6 13 
Investor protection index 4.37 1.76 2 7.7 
Borrower and lender rights index 5 1.90 3 8 
Enforcing contracts 37.14 4.32 29 42 
Market capitalisation % GDP 34.65 29.93 6.76 106.75 
Stock market liquidity 6.34 12.15 0.0011 44.16 
Inflation 5.40 2.87 0.98 11.56 
Income  2579.40 1210.83 1440 4709 
Financial intermediary development 60.49 29.15 20.38 101.28 
Savings 24.35 12.01 11.18 52.43 
 
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics English Legal origin 
 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
 
Business entry regulation 11.15 3.38 6 18 
Investor protection index 5.46 1.16 4 8 
Borrower and lender rights index 8.15 1.14 6 10 
Enforcing contracts 38.10 4.17 30 44 
Market capitalisation % GDP 46.71 78.92 0.72 294.53 
Stock market liquidity 14.41 35.85 0.0023 150.44 
Inflation 10.30 5.35 1.39 26.67 
Income  713.95 1050.14 134 3720 
Financial intermediary development 27.10 13.69 13.53 62.70 
Savings 10.99 7.75 -3.44 30.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3: Indicators of Stock Market Development in Africa: Average 2003-2007 
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Country Market Capitalization % 
GDP 
Stock Traded % GDP Listed Domestic 
Companies 
Botswana 31.706 0.708 18.2 
Ghana 21.026 0.620 29.6 
Kenya 38.436 3.492 49.4 
Malawi 9.065 0.328 8.8 
Mauritius 51.682 2.694 50.8 
Namibia 7.846 0.208 11.4 
Nigeria 24.454 3.492 207 
South Africa 235.496 98.37 408 
Swaziland 8.348 0.002 5.8 
Tanzania 5.0725 0.1305 6.2 
Uganda 1.085 0.0165 4.6 
Zambia 14.068 0.28 13.8 
Egypt 72.810 24.842 708.2 
Morocco 58.368 13.372 60 
Tunisia 11.766 1.316 46.8 
Brazil 63.200 22.20 387.8 
Mexico 28.800 6.80 143.6 
Malaysia 152.00 50.40 988.4 
Thailand 75.200 56.00 476.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators and author‟s calculations. 
 
 
Table B.4:Before correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation  LM test 
F-Statistic 
 
8.407 
 
4.761 
 
5.297 
 
3.349 
White’s Heteroskedasticity Test  
                                                            F-statistic 
 
6.012 
 
7.324 
 
4.113 
 
5.289 
Durbin-Watson Statistic  
F-statistic 
 
2.987 
 
3.212 
 
6.524 
 
4.754 
 
Table B.5:After controlling for Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test 
F-statistic 
 
1.865 
 
1.1539 
 
2.932 
 
1.136 
White’s Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
0.307 
 
1.070 
 
0.378 
 
1.357 
Durbin-Watson Statistic  
F-statistic 
 
1.654 
 
0.255 
 
1.142 
 
0.109 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Pairwise Correlation 
 
 Corruption Type of regime Party 
fractionalisation 
Revolutions 
Corruption 1.0000    
Type of regime 0.0197 
(0.8683) 
1.0000   
Party 
fractionalisation 
 
-0.0469 
(0.6959) 
-0.1109 
(0.3245) 
1.0000  
Revolutions -0.3445 
(0.0007)* 
0.0807 
(0.4685) 
-0.3927 
(0.0003)* 
1.0000 
* Significance at 10% level 
 
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable              Mean  Standard dev.  Min.  Max. 
Business regulation         19.99305    3.616668  13.33  30 
Corruption          2.947761    1.024491    1.4  6 
Inflation          68.23635    564.8184            -5.36  6723.7 
Aggregate investment         20.48731    8.518267  -13  46.38 
Private investment          14.04345    6.820341     0  43.4 
Literacy rate          30.55931    13.2871    7.2  74.3 
Infrastructure          129.8917    222.9905     2  1250.84 
Revolutions          0.234482    0.500192    0  2 
Party fractionalisation         4968.455    2478.016    0  9683 
Types of regimes         1.041379    0.232016    1  3 
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Table C.3: Before correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test 
F-statistic 
 
11.112 
 
10.354 
 
16.986 
White’s Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
5.533 
 
8.563 
 
6.522 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (Autocorrelation) 
F-statistic 
 
7.625 
 
7.548 
 
10.871 
 
Table C.4: After correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation. 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test 
                                                            F-statistic 
 
1.907                                    
 
2.673 
 
0.954 
White’s Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
1.264 
 
2.103 
 
1.529 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (Autocorrelation) 
F-statistic 
 
2.325 
 
0.368 
 
2.051 
 
 
Table C.5:Before correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM 
test F-statistic 
 
17.886 
 
23.143 
 
10.476 
 
9.111 
 
5.888 
 
7.377 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
8.077 
 
9.369 
 
5.554 
 
7.773 
 
8.661 
 
9.445 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
(Autocorrelation) F-statistic 
 
23.981 
 
44.776 
 
38.544 
 
19.687 
 
26.897 
 
54.235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.6: After correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation. 
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Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM 
test 
F-statistic 
      
2.322              
 
1.843 
 
2.075 
 
1.966 
 
1.928 
 
2.302 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
2.645 
 
1.378 
 
0.895 
 
1.554 
 
1.647 
 
1.813 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
(Autocorrelation) 
F-statistic 
 
2.003 
 
1.225 
 
2.110 
 
1.783 
 
2.098 
 
1.742 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1: List of countries  
 
 
Landlocked 
 
Coastal 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mali 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Uganda 
Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Angola 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Congo Republic 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Egypt 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
 
 
Table D.2: Before correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test                                         
F-statistic 5.117 9.316 1.117 
 
4.523 
 
11.865 
 
10.944 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
6.325 
 
7.789 
 
2.014 
 
3.647 
 
9.420 
 
5.167 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (Autocorrelation)                    
F-statistic 
 
8.243 
 
11.274 
 
3.956 
 
2.789 
 
6.091 
 
1.998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.3: After correction of Serial-correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation 
 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test                                         
F-statistic  1.713 1.776 
 
1.085 
 
2.221 
 
2.156 
 
1.889 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic 
 
1.824 
 
1.431 
 
1.811 
 
2.587 
 
1.650 
 
1.532 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (Autocorrelation)                    
F-statistic 
 
2.207 
 
1.801 
 
1.021 
 
1.476 
 
1.384 
 
0.854 
 
